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GENERAL AVERAGE
A STUDY OF EMIRATI LAW, YORKANTWERP RULES AND ENGLISH LAW
Dr. Abdulla Hassan Mohamed((1)
A. Abstract
B. Introduction
1. Definition of General Average
2. Requirements of General Average
2.1. Sacrifice or Expenditure must be 'extraordinary'
2.1.1. General Average Sacrifices
i) Of the Cargo
ii) Of the Ship
iii) Of the Freight
2.1.2. General Average Expenditures
i) Salvage Costs
ii) Temporary Repair
iii) Port of Refuge Expenses
iv) Environmental Costs
v) Substituted Expenses
2.2. Intentionally and reasonably made or incurred
2.2.1. Intentionally made or incurred
2.2.2. Reasonably made or incurred
2.2.3. Fault
2.2.4. Fault and Exception Clauses
2.3. In Time of Peril
2.4. For common Safety of the Voyage
2.5. Success
3. Adjustment of General Average
3.1. Defining Adjustment
3.2. Categories of General Average
i) Sacrifice of Ship
ii) Sacrifice of Cargo
iii) Sacrifice of Freight
3.3. Contribution to General Average
(1)
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i) Contribution by Ship
ii) Contribution by Cargo
iii) Contribution by Freight
4. Conclusion
ABSTRACT
The rules concerning general average are amongst the oldest in the maritime
field. They have their basis in the fact that, during a voyage, the ship, cargo and
freight form part of a common venture. The principle underlying the rules is
simple. If the common venture comes under threat during a voyage - for
instance, because the ship springs a leak and is in danger of sinking - then
extraordinary sacrifices and expenditure necessary to prevent the loss of the
venture must be apportioned according to the value of each respective interest.
The rules on general average have developed over time and the main legal
source of the rules today is the so called York- Antwerp Rules. Emirate has
adopted the York-Antwerp Rules into its Maritime Code.
It is proposed to discuss in this article the principle of general average; and
to show how far it has been established, and what rules based on it have been
laid down by judicial authority.
B. INTORDUCTION
In every adventure involving the carriage of goods by sea, maritime law
implies an agreement between all interested in that adventure to underwrite each
other against deliberate losses suffered by any of them for the greater benefit of
all. In this respect, maritime law recognises that the shipper, the carrier and even
the crew of a ship engaged in the carriage of goods are bound by a joint
adventure in which all share a common interest in the safe arrival of the ship at
her destination. Implicit also therefore is an understanding between these joint
venturers that circumstances may arise during the voyage which require the
master of the ship to make an extraordinary and justifiable sacrifice, perhaps by
jettisoning cargo, by intentionally subjecting his ship to damage, or by incurring
extraordinary expenditure, and thereby avoid the loss of both ship and cargo
carried on board. In these circumstances, the party sustaining loss or incurring
expense for benefit of the whole may look for recompense to the other
interested parties who have benefited from the safe conclusion of the voyage.
The legal relationship with which maritime law exacts payment from the
beneficiaries of the sacrifice or expense to those suffering loss, is known as
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'general average'.(2) It is a relationship, which flows from the nature of the
circum-stances in which the ship finds herself and from the type of sacrifice
reasonably made to extricate her and her remaining cargo from those
circumstances. It requires neither a contractual nexus nor the fault of any party,
and is a remedy which rests on this equitable principle - that it is most consistent
with justice, where the property of several has been equally in peril that those
whose property has been saved, by the sacrifice of the property of others, share
the loss of what has been sacrificed, in common with its owners.(3)
Notwithstanding the universality of the principle of general average, the
method of assessment of general average contribution varies materially from
one country to another. This gave rise to very troublesome problems under
conflict of laws. Shipowners, merchants, underwriters and average
adjusters have therefore collaborated, and after joint deliberations
produced a standard set of rules relating to general average.(4) These rules
are known as the York-Antwerp Rules, so called from the seats of the
conferences which first brought them into being. The first general average rules
(2) General average is said to date from the Rhodian Law of approximately 800 B. C., which stipulated
that if a ship was in danger and cargo was jettisoned to save the ship, then the ship and the remaining cargo
were required to make a contribution to the owner of the lost cargo; see C. Abbott, A Treatise of the Law
relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen, 14th ed., p. 752: "The principle of this general contribution
is known to be derived from the ancient laws of Rhodes, being adopted into the Digest of
Justinian with an express recognition of its true origin. The wisdom and equity of the rule will do
honor to the memory of the state, from whose code it has been derived, as long as maritime
commerce shall endure."
(3) "The principle of general average, namely, that all whose property has been saved by the sacrifice of
the property of another shall contribute to make good his loss, is of very ancient date, and of universal
reception among commercial nations. The obligation to contribute, therefore, depends not so much upon
the terms of any particular instrument, as upon a general rule of maritime law" per Abbott C.J. in Simonds
v. White (1824) 2 B&C 504, at p. 811. Brett L.J., in Burton v. English (1883) 12 Q.B.D. 218, 220 said:
"I do not think that it (the right to contribution) forms any part of the contract to carry, and that it does not
arise from any contract at all, but from the old Rhodian laws, and has become incorporated into the law of
England as the law of the ocean. It is not a matter of contract, but in consequence of a common danger,
where
natural
justice requires that all should contribute to indemnify the loss of property which is sacrificed by one in
order that the whole adventure may be saved."
(4) 'It may safely be said that general average is the field of maritime law where the international
unification effort has succeeded to the greatest degree.' N G Hudson 'The New York-Antwerp Rules
Examined' 1974 LMCLQ 162.
The York-Antwerp Rules, it should be particularly understood, are not the subject of national statutes or
international conventions, but are imposed by special clauses in standard form contracts - principally bills
of lading; see Goulandris Brothers Ltd. v. B. Goldman & Sons Ltd. [1958] 1 Q.B. 74 at p. 91. A typical
general average clause reads as follows:
'General average shall be adjusted, stated and settled according to York-Antwerp Rules 1994 at the port of
or last port of discharge at Carrier's option and as to matters not provided for in these Rules, according to
the laws and usage at the port of or any other place at the option of the Carrier.'
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were agreed upon in 1860 as the Glasgow Rules. These were followed by the
York Rules of 1864 and the York-Antwerp Rules of 1877. As from that time
the rules have been more and more frequently incorporated in contracts of
affreightment, and also in policies of marine insurance, until now it is the usual
practice to adopt them. At the same time they have been revised from time to
time, that is in 1890, 1924, 1950, 1974 (amended in 1990), 1994 and 2004.(5)
Some countries have incorporated the Rules into their maritime
legislations,(6) while others leave it to the contracting parties to agree to their

(5) Since 1924 the Rules have consisted of a number of lettered rules (A-G), which deal with matters of
general principle, followed by numbered rules (I-XXII) which provide for specific points in more detail.
Both sets of Rules are proceeded by a rule of interpretation, providing that in the adjustment of general
average, the lettered and numbered rules shall apply to the exclusion of any law and practice inconsistent
there with. It furthermore provides that the numbered rules will proceed on the lettered rules.
Without going into details, the various numbered rules, relating to particular cases, can be listed as follows:
 Rule I: jettison of cargo
 Rule II: damage by jettison and sacrifice for the common safety
 Rule III: extinguishing fire on shipboard
 Rule IV: cutting away wreck
 Rule V: voluntary stranding
 Rule VI: salvage remuneration
 Rule VII: damage to machinery and boilers
 Rule VIII: expenses lightening a ship when ashore, and consequent damage
 Rule IX: ship's materials and stores burnt for fuel
 Rule X: expenses at port of refuge, etc.
 Rule XI: wages and maintenance of crew and other expenses bearing up for and in a port
of refuge etc. ...
 Rule XII: damage to cargo in discharging, etc.
 Rule XIII: deduction from costs of repairs
 Rule XIV: temporary repairs
 Rule XV: loss of freight
 Rule XVI: amount to be made good for cargo lost or damaged by sacrifice
 Rule XVII: contributory values
 Rule XVIII: damage to ship
 Rule XIX: undeclared or wrongfully declared cargo
 Rule XX: provision of fund
 Rule XXI: interest on losses made good in general average
 Rule XXII: treatment of cash deposits.
There are a number of differences between YAR 1974, 1994 and 2004the three sets of Rules, of which the
most important are:
'(1) The 1994 Rules introduced (a) a Clause Paramount, which excludes from general average any sacrifice
or expenditure which was not reasonably made or incurred, and (b) provisions relating to pollution and
damage to the environment.
(2) The 2004 Rules (a) exclude from general average salvage remuneration, and crew wages, and (b)
introduce a time bar for claims.'
(6) Emirati Maritime Code 1981 adopted, in general, 1974 Rules; see the Explanatory Note to the Draft
of the Emirati Maritime Code, p. 106.
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application.(7) In the increasingly rare instances where the Rules do not apply to
a particular case of general average or where the Rules, not being a selfcontained code, require supplementation, the law of the country whose law
governs the general average must be applied.
The rules concerning general average are laid down in Articles 340 till 365
of the Emirati Maritime Code 1981.
This article attempts to explore various issues within the general average
system itself in the context of Emirati Maritime Code 1981 (hereinafter referred
to EMC) and York-Antwerp Rules (hereinafter referred to YAR).(8) It will cover
the following main issues:
1. Definitions of General Average.
2. Essentials of General Average Claim.
3. Adjustment of General Average.
Because of the lack of decided cases in general average matters in Emirate,
reference will be made in the present study to English law(9) because owing to
more activity in its courts, England has developed the law of general
average. Emirate has enjoyed no opportunity to do the same.
To prevent confusion, we must realize that the term 'general average' is used
in three distinct, though connected, senses, viz., to denote the act of making the
sacrifice, the loss sustained by the sacrifice, and the contributions levied on the
adventure to recoup the loser.(10)
A final point, in considering the subject of general average it is necessary for
the present to dismiss altogether the question of marine insurance.
1. DEFINITION OF GENERAL AVERAGE
According to Article 342/1 of the EMC, general average consists of '(Free
translation) extraordinary sacrifices or expenditures intentionally and
reasonably made for the common safety for the purpose of preserving the ship
or its cargo from peril threatening them.'(11)

(7) The Rules do not have the force of law in the United Kingdom except by express agreement in
particular transactions; see Carver, Carriage by Sea, 13th ed., para. 1350.
(8) Unless otherwise stated the comments apply equally to the 1974, 1994 and 2004 Rules.
(9) Reference also has to be made to American law where this appeared to be desirable.
(10) Carver, Carriage By Sea, 13th ed., para. 1351.
(11) EMC, Article 342/1 reads in Arabic as follows:
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YAR also provide a definition in Rule A:
'There is a general average act, when, and only when, any
extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally and reasonably
made or incurred for the common safety for the purpose of preserving
from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure'.
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 of the United Kingdom defines ‘general
average act’, in virtually identical terms at Section 66 (2):
'There is a general average act where any extraordinary sacrifice or
expenditure is voluntarily and reasonably made or incurred in time of peril
for the purpose of preserving the property imperilled in the common
adventure'.
The above definitions are, in themselves, a codification of the principles laid
down in past English cases of which the definition provided by Lawrence J. in
Birkley v. Presgrave (12) is particularly noteworthy:
"All losses which arise in consequence of extraordinary sacrifices
made, or expenses incurred for the preservation of ship and cargo, comes
within general average and must be borne proportionately by all who are
interested."(13)
2. ESSENTIALS OF GENERAL AVERAGE CLAIM
According to the above definitions, there is a general average whenever
property, either the ship, her cargo or the freight, which are involved in a
' تعتبر خسائر مشتركة التضحيات والنفقات االستثنائية المبذولة قصدا وبطريقة معقولة من أجل السالمة العامة
'.اتقاء لخطر داهم يهدد السفينة أو حمولتها

(12) (1801) 1 East 220.
(13) (1801) 1 East 220, at 228. A more comprehensive definition of general average was provided by
Blackburn J. in Kemp v. Halliday (1865) 34 LJQB 233,34 a case which concerned a ship, loaded with
cargo, which put into Falmouth for repairs, but which later sank in a squall. The ship was later raised, and
both ship and cargo were salved. The court was then faced with deciding who was liable in general
average. Thus, the issue of general average was analysed in some depth. In delivering his judgment
Blackburn J. said:
"In order to give rise to a charge as general average it is essential that there should be a voluntary sacrifice
to preserve more subjects than one exposed to a common jeopardy; but an extraordinary expenditure
incurred for that purpose is as much a sacrifice as if, instead of money being expended for the purpose,
money's worth were thrown away. It is immaterial whether the shipowner sacrifices a cable or an anchor to
get the ship off a shoal, or pays the worth of it to hire those extra services which get her off. It is quite true,
that so long as the expenditure by the shipowner is merely such as he should incur in the fulfilment of his
ordinary duties as shipowner, it cannot be general average; but the expenditure in raising a submerged ship
with cargo is extraordinary expenditure, and is, if incurred to save the cargo as well as the ship (which,
prima facie, is the object of such an expenditure), chargeable against all the subjects in jeopardy saved by
this expenditure".
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common maritime adventure, are voluntarily sacrificed in times of peril, and
this for the common benefit of ship, cargo and freight, or else, when
extraordinary expenses are incurred, also in the common benefit of this
endangered property.(14)
Thus, a claim in general average must satisfy the following distinguishing
requirements(15):
(i) There must be an extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure.
(ii) The sacrifice or expenditure must have been intentionally and
reasonably made or incurred.
(iii) The sacrifice or expenditure must be made or incurred in a time
of peril.
(iv) The sacrifice or expenditure must be made or incurred for the
specific purpose of preserving the property imperilled in the common
adventure.
A loss that does not satisfy each of these conditions will amount to
'particular average'(16) and the party sustaining it will have no right to
contribution from the other interests.
2.1. EXTRAORINARY SACRIFICE OR EXPENDITURE
For there to be a general average loss, there must be an 'extraordinary'
sacrifice or expenditure which is made for the benefit of all the parties to the
common adventure. 'Extraordinary' means that what is done to escape the
calamity is something not incidental to an ordinary voyage of the kind on which
the ship is engaged. Ordinary losses and expenses, which are incurred during
(14) See the Explanatory Note to the Draft of the Emirati Maritime Code, p. 108.
(15) The requirements for a general average were also set out by the US Supreme Court in Barnard v.
Adams 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270, 303 (1850):
"In order to constitute a case for general average, three things must concur1st. A common danger, a danger in which ship, cargo, and crew all participate; a danger imminent and
apparently 'inevitable,' except by voluntarily incurring the loss of a portion of the whole to save the
remainder.
2d. There must be a voluntary jettison...or casting away, of some portion of the joint concern for the
purpose of avoiding this imminent peril...or, in other words, a transfer of the peril from the whole to a
particular portion of the whole.
3d. This attempt to avoid the imminent common peril must be successful."
(16) See EMC, Article 341 reads as follows:
'(Free translation) Any loss, on which the provisions of (Article 246/1) are not applicable, shall be
considered as a particular average.'

"..."تعتبر خسائر خاصة الخسائر التي ال تتوافر فيها شروط الخسائر المشتركة
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the course of the voyage, cannot be recovered by general average.(17) If, for
example, a ship meets with heavy weather, which threatens to become worse,
and the master decides to increase the speed of his ship in order to reach port,
the cost of extra fuel consumed is not a general average expense. Nor is
additional expenditure for fuel, and wages and provisions of the crew,
necessitated by reason of the voyage being prolonged owing to the ship having
sustained damage: such expenditure the shipowner is bound to incur in order to
fulfil his duty towards the owners of the cargo he has contracted to carry.
Property that is sacrificed may consist of the cargo, the ship, or the freight or
any combination of them. Sacrifice of each type of property will be treated
separately, then expenditures are discussed.
2.1.1. GENERAL AVERAGE SACRIFICES
i) Of the Cargo
The most common instance of cargo being sacrificed for the common safety
of the adventure is when it is jettisoned (i.e. throwing overboard of cargo or part
of it) in order to lighten the ship and keep her afloat.(18)
(17) See the Explanatory Note to the Draft of the Emirati Maritime Code, p.108.
(18) See the Article 342/(a) of the EMC which provides that:
'General average shall include in particular...intentionally jettison of the goods into the sea...'
The modern law concerning the masters' right to jettison cargo in case of imminent danger begins with the
case of The Gratitudine (1801) 3 C.Rob. 240, 257, where Lord Stowell gave judgment as follows:
"Though in the ordinary state of things [the master of a ship) is a stranger to the cargo, beyond the
purposes of safe custody and' conveyance, yet, in cases of instant and unforeseen and unprovided
necessity, the character of agent and supercargo is forced upon him, not by the immediate act and
appointment of the owner, but by the general policy of the law; unless the law can be supposed to mean
that
valuable
property
in
his
hand
is
to
he
left
without
protection
and care. 1t must unavoidably be admitted that in some cases he must exercise the discretion of an
authorized agent over the cargo, as well in the prosecution of the voyage at sea, as in intermediate
ports, into which he may be compelled to enter. The case of throwing overboard parts of the cargo at sea, is
of that kind. Nothing can be better settled than that the master has a right to
exercise this power in case of imminent danger. He may select what articles he pleases; he may determine
what quantity; no proportion is limited; a fourth, a moiety, three-fourths, nay, in cases
of extreme necessity, when the lives of the crew cannot otherwise be saved, it never can be maintained
that he might not throw the whole cargo overboard. The only obligation will be, that the ship should
contribute its average proportion. It is said, this power of throwing over the whole cannot be but in cases of
extreme danger, which sweeps all ordinary rules before it; and so it is. So likewise with respect to any
proportion, he can be justified only by that necessity: nothing short of that will do: the mere convenience
of better sailing, or more commodious stowage, will not justify him to throw overboard the smallest part. It
must be a necessity of the same species, though perhaps differing in the degree."
In the American case of Lawrence v. Minturn (1854) 17 How. 110, the ship sailed from New York laden
with under-deck cargo and a heavy deck cargo, bound for San Francisco. In this voyage, she encountered
heavy weather during which it was found that the deck cargo caused her to labour very hard. After the
storm had passed the ship was leaking and her pumps had to be working constantly to keep her afloat.
Therefore, the master jettisoned the deck cargo, as a precaution, for it was likely for the ship to encounter
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However, under Article 347/1 of the EMC a sacrifice by jettison of cargo
stowed on deck (which is not a usual or proper place of stowage)(19), will give
rise to a general average contribution only when carried in accordance with a
recognised maritime custom,(20) or by consent of its owner.(21) Article 347/1 of
the EMC states that: (22)
'(Free translation) Goods which are carried on deck contrary to
Article (273) shall contribute in general average if they have been
salvaged. But if they have been jettisoned or damaged it shall not be
permissible for the owner of the same to consider them as general average
unless he establishes that he did not approve of the method of shipment (
being carried on the deck) or if the maritime custom at the port of loading
does not allow their shipment in deck.'
Rule I of the YAR, also requires any jettisoned cargo to be carried in
accordance with the recognised custom of the trade:
'No jettison of cargo shall be made good as general average unless
such cargo is carried in accordance with the recognised custom of the
trade.'(23)
other storms in her voyage. It was held that the master's action was justifiable and it was therefore a
general average act. But see The Pendragon Castle (1924) 5 Fed.Rep.56 (2nd Series), where the danger to
a ship was her master who was incompetent and in fear of her sinking, although no real imminent danger
existed, the master in his panic, called for and received salvage services from another ship, and he
jettisoned some cargo. Hough J. said inter alia, at page 58: "... it was a measure of precaution to jettison
some grain. Whether that jettison did more than calm the nerves of the ... master is rather doubtful ...".
Thus, he rejected the precautionary measure of jettison, on the grounds of it not achieving the intended
beneficial result. In other words, the danger, i.e. the master's panic and incompetence was not avoided or
minimised by the jettison of the cargo. Therefore, the jettison of the cargo, was not a general average act.
(19) "According to the rules of maritime law, the placing of goods upon the deck of a sea-going ship is
improper stowage, because they are hindrances to the safe navigation of the ship; and their jettison is
therefore regarded, in a question with the other shippers of cargo, as a justifiable riddance of incumbrances
which ought never to have been there, and not as a sacrifice for the common safety": per Lord Watson,
Strang v. Scott (l889) 14 App.Cas. 601, 609.
(20) In Gould v. Oliver (1865) 19 C.B. (N.S.) 563, twenty-six pieces of timber were shipped on deck.
There was a custom in the timber trade to carry lumber on deck. The twenty- six pieces were properly
jettisoned. It was held, that cargo owner was entitled to a general average contribution from ship to freight:
semble, also from cargo.
(21) As would be the case where all cargo was carried under bills of lading that gave the shipowner a
liberty to carry on deck.
(22) EMC, Article 347/1 reads in Arabic as follows:

 أما ان،) تسهم في الخسائر المشتركة إذا أنقذت372( "البضائع المشحونة على سطح السفينة خالفا ألحكام المادة
ا ألقيت في البحر أو تلفت فال يجوز لمالكها اعتبارها خسارة مشتركة إال إذا أثبت أنه لم يوافق على شحنها على
".سطح السفينة أو إذا كان العرف البحري في ميناء الشحن ال يجري على شحنها بهذه الكيفية

(23) To constitute a custom of the trade to carry cargo on deck, much more is required than the occasional
or even frequent carrying of deck loads. There must be a practice so general and universal in the trade that
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Although Rule I does not mention deck cargo specifically, but it follows
from its wording that jettisoned cargo carried on deck in accordance with a
recognized trade custom ranks as a general average loss. Thus, only such cargo
does not so rank that is not stowed in accordance with a custom, and that
applies both to deck and under-deck cargo.
Under English law, as a general rule the loss by jettison of cargo carried on
deck is not made good by general average contribution, unless carriage in this
manner is sanctioned by established maritime custom, or where the owners of
the other cargo carried had consented to the jettisoned cargo being thus
carried.(24)Where, however, the whole cargo is the property of the same owner,
and by express agreement between him and the shipowner in the charter-party a
portion of it is carried on deck, then, unless otherwise provided in the contract
of carriage, a loss by jettison of the deck load will give rise to a right of
contribution.(25)
everyone in that trade must be taken to know that his goods will or may probably be put on deck. It must
also be consistent with the express terms of the contract of affreightment. In Dixon v. Royal Exchange
Shipping Co. (1886) 12 App. Cas. 11 Brett M.R. said:
"It is suggested that there is a practice which it must be taken that they knew. Now the only practice which
it can be taken in law that they impliedly knew (that is, taken that they knew, although they did not) is a
general practice; so general and universal in the trade and at the port from which these goods were taken,
that everybody who ships cotton on board a ship at New Orleans for England must be taken to know that
his goods probably will, or may probably be put on deck. ... To say that there is a practice, or to say that
there is a frequent practice, is only to say that it is sometimes done, leaving it open that as often, or oftener,
it is not done. Such evidence as that is not evidence to go to a jury, upon which they would be justified in
finding a general usage."
(24) See Wright v. Marwood (1881) 7 Q.B.D. 62 a steamer had shipped 100 head of cattle on her upper
deck, to be carried from New York to England, under a written agreement with the shippers specifying that
the cattle were to be carried on deck. The bill of lading contained the following clause ‘Not accountable for
mortality or for any accident or injury of any kind or nature whatever.’ On the voyage, owing to stress of
weather, the master, justifiably for the safety of the ship, threw overboard the whole of these cattle. The
owner of the cattle brought an action against the shipowner for his share of the loss as " general
contribution." At the trial, no evidence was given of any custom allowing cattle to be carried as deck cargo.
It was held by the court that the shipper was not entitled to recover a general average contribution from the
shiponwers for the jettison of the cattle. The court laid stress on the fact of the ship being a general ship,
and held it impossible to imply any agreement to pay contribution merely from the fact that the shipper and
owner had agreed for cargo to be shipped on deck, and that apart from such an agreement there was no
foundation for the shipper's claim.
(25) See Johnson v. Chapman (1865) 19 C.B. (N.S.) 563 where a cargo was carried under a
charterparty contract which expressly provided for a full cargo, including a deck load. Part of the deck
cargo was necessarily jettisoned during the voyage. There was no custom authorising the carriage of deck
cargo in such a voyage. The cargo-owner claimed for a contribution, while the shipowners contended that
the jettison was, under the circum- stances of the case, only a particular average loss and not a loss
entitling him to a contribution. The Court of Common Pleas decided in favour of the claim, on the ground
that the charterparty contemplated a deck cargo. "Then, immediately you find that the deck cargo is within
the contemplation of the parties, you must deal with it as if shipping a deck cargo was lawful. When you
have established that it is a deck cargo lawfully there by the contract of the parties, it becomes subject to
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In certain trades it is customary for deck cargo to be carried 'at shipper's
risk'. The clause ‘at shipper's risk’ which appears in the contract of carriage
protects the shipowner from liability for improper jettison, resulting from acts of
the crew done as the servants of the shipowner, but not from liability for general
average contribution in respect of a proper jettison which is made by the captain
as agent of the cargo-owner.(26)
If the goods are stowed on deck without the shipper's consent or a binding
custom so to stow, and are then jettisoned, the shipowner will be liable for such
a jettison as a breach of his contract to carry safely in the absence of an effective
exception.(27)
There is equally a general average loss where, in consequence of a fire on
board, the cargo is damaged by water being poured on it to extinguish the fire,
or through the ship being scuttled with the same object (28); or where, through

the 'rule of general average".
(26) Cargo carried on deck 'at shipper's risk' may be the subject of allowance under EMC, Article 246/1
and YAR, Rule A, if it is jettisoned for the common safety in a time of peril, and is cargo which in the
particular trade is customarily carried on deck. In Burton v. English (1883) 10 Q.B.D. 442; 12 Q.B.D.
218, the ship was chartered to carry a full cargo of timber from a port in the Baltic for London, and the
charterparty contained the clause, 'The teamer to be provided with a deck load, if required, at full freight,
but at merchant's risk.' It was proved that there was a custom or usage in such voyages to carry a deck load
of timber. Cave J. delivering the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division, held that the word 'at merchant's
risk' exempted the shipowner from liability to contribute towards the loss of deck cargo lawfully
jettisoned.' The Court of Appeal, reversing Cave J. decided that the shipowner was not protected by
the words 'at merchant' risk' from liability to contribute to the general average.
(27) In Royal Exchange S.S. Co v. Dixon (1886) 12 App.Cas. II, cotton was shipped under bills of lading
excepting 'jettison' and 'stranding'. Some of the cotton was stowed on deck without the cargo owner's
consent; the ship stranded, and the deck cotton was properly jettisoned. An attempt to prove a custom to
stow on deck failed. It was held that the cargo-owner was entitled to recover the full value of the cotton
from the shipowner.
(28) See Article 342/2(c) of the EMC which provides that:
'General average shall include in particular...damage caused to ...the cargo by reason of pouring of water
or other materials or scuttling the ship in order to extinguish a fire on board.'
In Whitecross Wire & Iron Co. v. Savill (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 653, a ship bound for W had arrived at that port,
and had landed the greater portion of her cargo, when a fire broke out on board, which was extinguished by
pouring water into her hold. Among other portions of the cargo damaged by the water poured in was a
quantity of iron wire. The owners of the wire made a claim on the shipowners for contribution towards
their damage, as general average, and the court gave judgment in their favour. This was appealed against.
The judgment of the court was unanimous against the appeal. Brett L.J. said at p. 662 "If there is an
imminent danger, and if the captain sacrifices part in order to save the rest of the adventure, a claim for a
general average contribution arises...here the captain intentionally inundated the cargo and thereby
necessarily damaged it by water. ... All the circumstances seem to me to exist which constitute a general
average loss."
Where the YAR apply this principle is recognised in Rule II:
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stress of circumstances, it becomes necessary to burn part of the cargo to enable
the engines to keep going.(29) Thus, in Robinson v. Price(30)a ship bound with
timber from Quebec for London, was, and had been for several years, supplied
with a donkey-engine adapted for the loading and discharge of cargo and ballast
and also for pumping the ship, to aid the ship's hand pumps, when required.
'Damage done to a ...cargo...by or in consequence of a sacrifice made for the common safety, and by water
which goes down a ship's hatches opened or other opening made for the purpose of making a jettison for
the common safety, shall be made good as general average.'
But damage done by smoke and heat alone does not attract a contribution. Rule III of the YAR provides
that:
'Damage done to a ... cargo...by water or otherwise, including damage by beaching or scuttling a burning
ship, in extinguishing a fire on board the ship, shall be made good as general average, except that no
compensation shall be made for damage by smoke however caused or by heat of the fire.'
For engendering smoke and heat was not intended. Of course, smoke created by pumping water on the fire
was created intentionally, but no one can distinguish between smoke created by fire and smoke created by
water. So all smoke damage must be borne by whoever owns the affected property. In American case of
Marine Ins. Co. v. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. (1896) 70 Fed. Rep.262. fire broke out in a cargo of
hemp on board the Seneca. The hatches were closed, live steam from the boilers was let into the 'tween
decks for about seven hours, and the ship put back into Cuba where part of the cargo was discharged into
lighters and the ship then submerged. The insurers of sixty-four bales of tobacco claimed compensation in
general average for damage to the tobacco by smoke driven into the compartment for the purpose of
extinguishing the fire. The evidence was contradictory and inconclusive whether the tobacco was damaged
by smoke, and District Judge Brown held that a general average claim was not allowable for damage done
through the undesigned and unavoidable spread of fire or smoke in the proper efforts to extinguish them. In
the course of his judgment he said:
"Here not only is there very great doubt whether the tobacco was tainted by smoke at all, but if it was, the
smoke was an incident of the fire, and caused by the fire, and not by the act of man .... If the smothering of
the fire by closing the ship's hatches, or by forcing water or steam upon the fire, temporarily increased the
smoke, the fire was none the less the true and original cause of all the smoke, and hence of all the damage
it may have done; and this damage, if there was any such damage, must be classed with fire damage, as
particular
average
and
not
as
general
average, because done by smoke alone, as an incident of the fire, and not by the steam voluntarily
employed to extinguish it. . . . Often the first efforts to extinguish a fire give it breath and extend the flames
or
smoke
to
articles
before
untouched.
That
is
an
unavoidable
result
of
the endeaver to put out the fire. But damage thus arising is not a voluntary sacrifice giving rise to a general
average claim. And similar is the damage arising from any unavoidable spread of smoke by the use of
steam. . .. The fire, as the original cause of the smoke, must be treated as a whole, and as including
whatever damage may arise from the fire or the smoke during all proper efforts made to extinguish them. .
.. I cannot find any support for the contention that the spread of fire or smoke damage incidental to proper
efforts to extinguish the fire, gives rise to general average demands.... Only where the damage is done by
the agency employed to extinguish the fire, as in the case of water damage, can the damage be deemed a
voluntary sacrifice.... "
(29) See Article 342/2(e) of the EMC which provides that:
'General average shall include in particular...things and provisions required by the common safety to be
used as fuel provided that the ship was supplied with sufficient fuel before sailing then it ran out for any
reason.'
(30) See (1876) 2 Q.B.D. 91., a ship sprang a leak while at sea and was kept afloat only by constant
pumping, the pumps being driven by the donkey engine. The coal, which was sufficient for an ordinary
voyage, ran short, and ship's spars and cargo were used for fuel. It was held that the damage occurred was
to be made good by general average contribution.
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Such engines were often, though at that time not universally, used in that trade.
At the time of sailing the ship had five tons of coal on board, which was
admitted to be a sufficient supply of fuel for all purposes of the ship while at
sea, other than pumping, for a much longer voyage than that from Quebec to
London. While at sea the ship fell in with bad weather, and sprang so bad a leak
that she could hardly be kept free by constant pumping. For this purpose it
presently became necessary to have the pumps worked by the donkey-engine,
and as the supply of coal threatened to run short, the captain ordered some of
the ship's spare spars, and a portion of the cargo, to be used with the coal to
keep up the fire of the donkey-engine; by which means the ship was eventually
brought safe into port. The questions for the court were whether the burning of
the spare spars and whether the burning of the cargo, were to be made good as
general average. The court held, that the sacrifice of the spars and cargo was a
general average. The judgment of the court was delivered by Lush J. who said:
"The circumstances under which the ship's spars and the cargo were
used as fuel for the donkey-engine satisfy all the conditions of a general
average claim. The peril was imminent; the sacrifice voluntary, in the
sense of being an act of will on the part of the master; it was, in the
emergency, necessary in order to save the ship from sinking, and was, of
course, made with a view to the safety of the whole adventure-ship,
freight, and cargo. Prima facie, therefore, the case of the plaintiff is made
out."
The sale of part of the cargo at a port of refuge is a general average sacrifice
if it is necessary for the purpose of completing the voyage, and if it is in the
interest of the rest of the cargo that the voyage should be completed, but not in
any other case.(31) Moreover, any damage done to the cargo or depreciation in its
value caused by putting into a port of refuge to escape a peril is a general
average loss.(32)
(31) See Article XX of the YAR which provides that:
‘Provision of funds.
...the necessary cost of obtaining the funds required by means of a bottomry bond or otherwise, or the loss
sustained by owners of goods sold for the purpose, shall be allowed in general average.'
(32) In McCall v. Houlder (1897) 66 L.J.Q.B. 408., damage was done to the cargo at a port of refuge, in
tipping the ship by the head to repair her propeller. For that purpose water was run into her forward ballast
tanks; and owing to a break in one of the pipes the water got into the cargo. The break was due to an
accident in the course of the voyage; it was not known to the master, but he feared the possibility of it.
Tipping with cargo on board was an unusual operation, and the master knew it involved special risks and
might damage the cargo. He adopted this method of repairing the propeller because he could not discharge
the cargo (frozen meat) and store it in safety at the port. Mathew J. held that the damage was a
general average sacrifice, the tipping having been done " for the safety of the whole adventure and for the
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ii) Of the Ship
Sacrifice of the ship may be of the whole ship, such as when it is
intentionally stranded,(33)or of parts of it or of some of its machinery,
equipment, or stores.(34) In Birkely v. Presgrave (35) the ship was entering
Sunderland harbour with a cargo of corn on board when she was hit by a violent
squall. In order to save the ship and cargo, the master endeavoured to tie her up
to the south pier. In this, he was successful but, during the process of
manoeuvring the ship and saving the cargo, extra personnel were required for
advantage of everyone interested in the ship or cargo." The ship" was lying unnavigable in the harbour and
she and the cargo must have lain there till both perished if the ship had not been tipped." It must be noted
that the cargo was perishable, and Mathew J. seems to have held that the unusual act was necessary for the
preservation of both ship and cargo.
In Anglo -Argentine Live Stock Co. v. Temperley SS Co.,[1899] 2 Q.B. 403 the ship took on board in the
River Plate a deck cargo of cattle and sheep for England, under a contract which provided that the ship
should on no account touch at any Brazilian or Continental ports before landing her livestock. Soon after
sailing she sprang a leak, and as the water could not be kept down, the master put into Bahia, a Brazilian
port, for repairs. The consequence was that, by reason of an Order in Council then in force, the cattle could
not be landed in England and they were taken instead to Antwerp where they realised much lower prices
than they would have fetched in England. The court held that the owners of the livestock were entitled to
recover in general average the difference in prices as a loss which was the direct and immediate
consequence of the general average act. "The moment the ship touched the Brazilian port," he said, "the
plaintiffs' property was ipso facto rendered of less value than it was before, because by that act the
plaintiffs were deprived of one of their means, and that the best, of realising their property."
(33) See EMC, Article 342/2(b) which provides that:
'General average shall include in particular...stranding the ship intentionally for the common safety ...'
See also YAR, Rule V:
'Voluntary Stranding.
When a ship is intentionally run on shore for the common safety, whether or not she might have been
driven on shore, the consequent loss or damage to the property involved in the common maritime
adventure shall be allowed in general average.'
In The Seapool [1934] P. 53 the master deliberately put the ship broadside against
a pier, in order to minimise damage that must otherwise inevitably have been suffered by running ashore. It
was held that Rule V did not apply because running against a pier was not voluntary stranding or running
on shore within the meaning of the rule. Langton J. stated at p. 62 that "stranding" means going with the
bottom on shore, and held that since Rule V did not apply, the owners were entitled to a general average
contribution by virtue of Rule A of the 1924 Rules.
(34) See Robinson v. Price (1876) 2 Q.B.D. 91, where a ship sailed well equipped, having a donkeyengine and a sufficient supply of coal for all purposes other than pumping purposes; she met with heavy
weather and leaked considerably, the donkey-engine was used to pump, and it was only by this steam
pumping that the leak was kept under; the coal ran short, and some of the spare spars were used for fuel. It
was held, that the sacrifice of the spars was a general average. But see the YAR 1994, Rule IX:
'...Ship's materials and stores, or any of them, necessarily used for fuel for the common safety at a time of
peril shall be admitted as general average, but when such an allowance is made for the cost of ship's
materials and stores the general average shall be credited with the estimated cost of the fuel which would
otherwise have been consumed in prosecuting the intended voyage.'
(35) (1801) 1 East 220.
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assistance. An anchor and its cable were deliberately sacrificed for safety
reasons, and some hawsers were also lost. The shipowners claimed as general
average the value of the cable and also that of the hawsers.
The court ruled that the actions of the master amounted to general average
acts, for which the cargo-owner was liable by way of a contribution.
In delivering his judgment, Lord Kenyon C.J. said:
"...all ordinary losses and damage sustained by the ship happening
immediately from the storm or perils of the sea must be borne by the
shipowners. But, all those articles which were made use of by the master
and crew upon the particular emergency, and out of the usual course, for
the benefit of the whole concern, and the other expenses incurred, must be
paid proportionately by the defendant as general average".(36)
In Charter Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Bowring, Jones & Tidy, Ltd.(37) a ship
shortly after leaving Jacksonville ran aground and was for a time in danger of
breaking her hack. After trying for approximately 3 hours to refloat by means of
her own engines, a tug rendered her assistance and thus she was refloated. It
was in respect of damage to machinery, boilers etc. caused by the accident that a
general average contribution was claimed. The shipowners claimed that the
damage to the machinery was caused entirely by the efforts to get the ship afloat
while lying aground and in particular due to the fact that the water pump of the
machinery, which was positioned pretty well amidships, was drawing in mud or
silt and depositing it in the boilers.
On the other hand, the cargo-owners contended that when the ship was upon
the ground she was not in a position of peril; that she was in no real danger,
since she was in inland water 20 miles from the sea, and the rising of the water
or the assistance of a tug would have been adequate to get her off.
In this case one of the question raised by the shipowners, was in relation to
the seaworthiness of the ship and whether if any general average expenditure or
sacrifice was incurred was due to this. The pilot did state that while rendering
his service to the ship, he experienced lack of power in consequence of which
the ship went aground.
Roche J. stated, inter alia, in delivering the judgment of the court:

(36) (1801) 1 East 220, at p.227.
(37) (1930) 36 Ll. Rep. 272, decided under the YAR 1890.
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"On the voyage to London and Hamburg, upon which she had started
when she took the ground, she ... met with heavy weather ... and her
engines and boilers worked very unsatisfactorily".
He went on to add that:
"In fact, she put into more than one port of refuge by reason of
shortage of coal and other matters. When she ultimately arrived at
Hamburg it was found that her boilers were in a state which can only be
described as dreadful ... they were a mass of scale".
Roche J. did not allow the whole claim for machinery damage in the
contribution. On the point of danger, he observed:
"The danger was not very great, but still I am satisfied that there was a
position of peril ... the danger was real and substantial enough to
necessitate the use of the engines".
In Harrison v. Bank of Australasia(38) a sailing ship left Melbourne bound
to London with cargo on board. The ship encountered a cyclone and sprung a
leak. The ship was fitted with a donkey-engine for working the cargo, hoisting
the sails and for pumping the ship, and in consequence of the excessive use of
the engine for pumping the ship, the coal supply (which was enough for use of
the donkey engine, for an ordinary voyage) began to run low and the master was
obliged to burn spare spars and ship's stores. Subsequently the master purchased
further supplies of coals, as it was necessary to pump the ship throughout the
voyage in order to save her from foundering. The donkey engine broke down as
the ship entered the Thames. The shipowner sought to recover from the cargo a
contribution towards the cost of the ship's fittings which were used as fuel, the
cost of the coal purchased, and the cost of repairing the donkey-engine. It was
held that the burning of the spars and the ship's stores was an extraordinary
sacrifice made in time of peril, but that there was no right to contribution in
respect of the cost of the coals or of the cost of repairing the donkey-engine.
It is submitted that loss or damage consequent upon the ship being
intentionally run on shore for the common safety is allowable as general
average, whether or not the ship might inevitably have been driven shore.(39)
Therefore, the unintentionally stranding of a disabled ship is not a general
(38) (1872) 25 L.T. 944.
(39) See EMC, Article 342(b) and YAR, Rule V. In The Cepheus, 1990 AMC 1058 the owner's claim for
a general average contribution from cargo was denied where the panel majority found that the ship had
made an unreasonable deviation which the owner failed to prove was not the cause of the ship's stranding.
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average act, nor is the intentionally stranding of a disabled ship, if the intention
in doing so was to save the lives of those on board rather than protect the ship
and cargo.
Damage caused to the ship or its machinery in attempting to refloat it after
intentionally stranding may be admissible in general average,(40) but damage
sustained by cutting away wrecked parts of the ship may not be claimed in
general average.(41) Loss incurred by scuttling or beaching a burning ship(42) or
through efforts to extinguish the fire on board is recoverable in general
average.(43)
(40) See EMC, Article 342/2(b) which provides that:
'General average shall include in particular...stranding the ship intentionally for the common safety or
increasing the sail or steam in order to refloat the ship, and the damage which caused to the ship or the
cargo as a result of this.'
and see also YAR, Rule VII which provides that.
"Damage caused to any machinery and boilers of a ship which is ashore and in a position of peril, in
endeavouring to refloat, shall be allowed in general average when shown to have arisen from
an actual intention to float the ship for the common safety at the risk of such damage...".
In Corfu Navigation v. Mobil Shipping [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 52, ship-owners claimed contribution in
general average under Rule VII for machinery damage, suffered during attempts to refloat which had been
made without sufficient preparation or planning to ascertain whether they had a reasonable chance of
success, as well as being negligently executed. The negligence in question was an excepted peril, but the
cargo owners contended that its effect was to break the chain of causation between the general average act
and the damage. This argument failed because the general average loss, under the provisions of Rule VII,
was the damage to the machinery in endeavouring to refloat at the risk of such damage.
(41) See YAR, Rule IV:
"Loss or damage sustained by cutting away wreck or parts of the ship which have previously
been carried away or are effectively lost by accident shall not be made good as general average."
"If", said Willes J. in Johnson v. Chapman (1865) 35 L.J.C.P. 26-29 "a mast were sprung and a part of it
were to go overboard with a quantity of spars and sails attached to it, hanging on by a stay which must give
way in a minute or two, whilst in the meantime, by battering against the side of the ship, it adds to the
danger, and if the stay were cut to let it go at once, it would be very difficult to say that that was anything
more than wreck. A lawyer could not lay down as a matter of pure law, that all cumber cut loose is wreck.
But what I say is, if it was virtually lost, if not recoverable, if the act of cutting the rope was only hastening
the moment at which it would be lost, you would properly call that wreck, and you would not say it was
general average. The reason given is because you cannot keep it. There is no intentional sacrifice in cutting
it away. You must lose it, and the losing it a minute or two sooner can make all the difference of its doing
great injury or not; but you cannot help losing it".
(42) Anglo-Grecian Steam Trading Co. v. T. Beynon & Co. (1926) 24 Ll.L.R. 122.
(43) See EMC, Article 342/2(c)
'General average shall include in particular...damage caused to ...the cargo by reason of pouring of water
or other materials or scuttling the ship in order to extinguish a fire on board.'
In Stewart v. West India & Pacific S.S. Co., (1873) L.R. 8 Q.B. 88. the Divisional Court approved the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Nimick v. Holmes (1855) 2 Pennsylvania. 366 that:
"... When a ship or its cargo takes fire without the fault of the crew, the damage done by the application of
water or steam in extinguishing the fire, and by tearing up part of the ship in order to get at it, is general
average.... It makes no difference how the water is applied, by the aid of fire-engines on the land, or in the
form of steam, or by the scuttling of the ship...."
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Damage done to the ship by knowingly causing her to come into collision, in
avoiding a common peril, may be a general average sacrifice.(44)
Damage inflicted on third parties, such as pier and dock-owners, may
constitute a general average sacrifice, and all parties must contribute to the
damages which one of them becomes liable to pay. In Austin Friars S.S. Co. v.
Spillers & Bakers,(45) a ship laden with maize, stranded in the Bristol Channel
in such a position that the ship and cargo were in imminent peril. The ship was
refloated with the assistance of tugs, and the intention at first was to beach her
in a safe place, but owing to serious leaks which developed, the pilot decided
instead to take her into Sharpness Docks. Both the master and the pilot
contemplated that the ship would strike the pier in entering the docks. Owing to
the strong tide and to the fact that the ship was without steam, the ship did in
fact strike the pier, and damaged herself to the extent of £1,600, and the pier to
the extent of £5,000.
Bailhache J. found as a fact that the action taken in putting into Sharpness
Docks, knowing that the ship would strike the pier, was a reasonable and
prudent action, and that the damage done to the ship was consequently a general
average sacrifice. He further held that the cost of making good the damage to
the pier, even though the expenditure was incurred in making good damage
done to the property of a third party, was a general average expenditure,
inasmuch as it was foreseen as the natural consequence of the general average
act.(46)
In Pool Shipping Co. v. Northern Maritime Insurance Co.,(47) the owners
of a steamer claimed in general average the damage done to their ship through
striking a pier head, and also the sum they had been compelled to pay for the
damage done to the pier. The owners contended that the ship was intentionally
allowed by the master to drift on to the pier, knowing that damage would be
done and sustained, in order to avoid the greater risk of driving ashore. It was

(44) Austin Friars Co. v. Spillers & Bakers [1915] 3 K.B. 586.
(45) [1915] 1 K.B. 833, affirmed [1915] 3 K.B. 586.
(46) A similar result was reached by the Court of Appeal in Australian Coastal Shipping Commission v.
Green [1971]1 QB 456 in respect of liabilities incurred by the shipowner under a contract of towage. In
that case ships in peril in New South Wales employed tugs under United Kingdom Standard Towing
Conditions to avert the peril. In the course of the operation one tug became a total loss and one required
salvage assistance; the shipowners were bound to indemnify the tugowners under the conditions. The
shipowners claimed general average contribution for the expenditure so incurred. Mocatta J. allowed their
claim, and the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from that decision.
(47) (1933) 47 Ll.L. Rep. 331.
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held that there had been an extraordinary sacrifice intentionally and reasonably
made for the common safety, and the owners' claim therefore succeeded.
In The Seapool,(48)a ship with a cargo of coal on board was anchored off the
pier. A sudden gale sprang up causing the ship to drag her anchor. There was a
danger of the ship losing the propellers and possibly breaking her back. The
master accordingly decided to put the ship broadside against the pier, using the
latter as a lever so as to get the ship's head into such a position that he could
steam out to sea. The operation was successful, but through bumping the ground
and grinding the pier, £14 000 damage was caused to ship and pier. It was held
that the action taken by the master was reasonable in the circumstances and the
loss was a general average loss.
iii) Of the Freight
There is a general average loss of freight where, in taking steps to avert the
danger to the whole adventure, the shipowner so damages a portion of the cargo
as to render it unfit to be carried to its destination, and thus sacrifices his
opportunity of earning freight on that portion(49). There is, however, no general
(48) [1934] P. 53·
(49) In Pirie v. Middle Dock Co., (1881) 44 L.T. 426, a fire had broken out on board the ship Attila bound
for Singapore with a cargo of coals, owing, as was admitted, to the spontaneous combustion of the coal.
Water was poured into the cargo continuously for three days and the ship was taken into Batavia for safety,
where the fire was quenched. Owing to the damaged state of the coal from the sea water, it was found
necessary to sell the whole of it at Batavia. The result was that the shipowner lost his freight, while the
owner of the coals, receiving the proceeds freight free, suffered no loss, but on the contrary made a profit
by the mishap. The shipowner thereupon claimed from him, as general average, contribution towards this
loss of freight, occasioned by the means taken to extinguish the fire. The owner of the coals disputed his
liability. It was held, that the shipowner was entitled to a general average contribution from the cargo on
account of the freight thus lost. Cf. Iredale v. China Traders Ins Co [1900] 2 Q.B. 515, where a ship on a
voyage with a cargo of coal from Cardiff to Esquimalt was obliged to put into a port of refuge in the River
Plate owing to the cargo having become so heated that there was a danger the ship and cargo would have
been totally lost had the voyage been proceeded with. Part of the cargo was discharged, when it was found
that the whole cargo was in such a condition that no portion of it could with safety be forwarded to its
destination. The balance of the cargo was accordingly discharged and the voyage abandoned, and the cargo
was sold and the freight was lost. It was contended that this abandonment, involved in the act of putting
in, was a general average act, and that there was therefore a sacrifice of the freight. Bigham J. held that that
was not so. The condition of the cargo, at the time the master altered his course for Buenos Aires,
was such that it had become impossible to carry it to its destination so as to earn the freight; nothing of
value was sacrificed. His judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, on the ground that there was no
abandonment of the voyage until the cargo was sold, and at that time the common danger had ceased.
On the other hand, the freight on the coal jettisoned was held, by Bigham J. to be a subject for contribution.
For, " although it was subsequently ascertained that the freight was at this time wholly lost, the
circumstances as then known did not justify that conclusion, and thus the captain may be properly said to
have substituted a certain loss of part for a probable loss of the whole of the adventure, so as to give rise to
a general average claim."
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average sacrifice of freight where, owing to the inherent defect of the cargo, the
shipowner has been compelled to put into a port of refuge and abandon the
attempt to carry it further, so that the freight was already lost. (50)
2.1.2. GENERAL AVERAGE EXPENDITURES
Having enumerated those cases of general average loss which arise out of
sacrifices, we will now proceed to consider those which are founded on
expenditures.
Expenses made on behalf of the common interests in the voyage are, in
many cases, admissible in general average.(51) The cost of salvaging ship
and cargo(52) or expenditure incidental to repairing the ship in a port of
refuge are common examples. Expenses made in anticipation of greater
general average expenditure - known as "substituted expenses" and costs incurred to protect the environment may also be recovered in
general average. The requirement that those expenditure must be
"extraordinary" is obviously of particular importance, since the charterer or bill
of lading holder is entitled to expect that the shipowner will bear all the ordinary
expenses of safeguarding ship and cargo during the voyage in consideration of
the payment of freight.(53) Thus, in Wilson v. Bank of Victoria,(54) a large
clipper ship with an auxiliary screw, whilst on a voyage from Australia to
England with cargo on board, hit an iceberg in the southern ocean and her masts
and rigging were so damaged that she had to continue to Rio de Janeiro under
steam alone and, in so doing, exhausted her stocks of coal. Finding when at Rio
that complete repairs would cost several thousands of pounds more than in
England, and would entail the unshipping of the cargo and considerable delay,
(50) Iredale v. China Traders Ins Co [1900] 2 Q.B. 515,
(51) "Wherever, under extraordinary circumstances of danger to both ship and cargo, a voluntary sacrifice
of money is made in order to save both ship and cargo, by the expenditure of which both ship and cargo are
saved, the person who has made the voluntary sacrifice is entitled to call upon the others whose property
has been saved, by the voluntary sacrifice made on their behalf as well as on his own, for general average
contribution." per Brett M.R., Ocean SS. Co. v. Anderson (1883) 13 Q.B.D. 651 , 622
51 In Kemp v. Halliday (1866) LR 1 QB 520, where a ship which sank in Falmouth harbour was later
salved and the issue of general average was foremost. Erle C.J. said at p. 527: "...We infer from the
statement in the case that there was a common peril of destruction imminent over ship and cargo as they
lay submerged; that the most convenient mode of saving either ship or cargo, or both, was by raising the
ship together with the cargo; that the expense required for such raising would be an extraordinary expense
for the common benefit of both; that the cargo would be liable to a general average contribution towards
the expense; and the shipowner would have a lien on the cargo to secure the payment of that general
average. See the Explanatory Note to the Draft of the Emirati Maritime Code, p. 239. See, also, EMC,
Article 342/2(i) and YAR, Rule VI.
(53) Carver, Carriage by Sea, 13th ed. para 1399.
(54) (1867) LR 2 QB 203
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the master had sufficient repairs done to her in three days, without taking out the
cargo, as would carry her home. He then sailed and arrived in England by
means of her auxiliary screw, having purchased coal at Rio and again at Fayal at
an extra cost to the owners of £1,472. The owners sought to recover some of the
cost of the coal from the cargo-owners by way of a general average
contribution.
The court held that the master had done no more than it was his duty to do,
and that the expenditure on coal was not an extraordinary expenditure, but was
really an expenditure which could have been envisaged as part of the operation
of a ship equipped with auxiliary power.
Blackburn J. in the course of the judgment of the court said:
"The shipowners by their contract with the freighters are bound to give
the services of their crew and their ship, and to make all disbursements
necessary for this purpose. In the case of such a ship as this, which is
equipped with an auxiliary screw, their contract (1) includes the use of
that screw, and consequently the disbursements necessary for fuel for the
steam engine. Now, the disaster which occurred in this case, no doubt,
caused the engine to be used to a much greater extent than would
generally occur on such a voyage, and so caused the disbursement for
coals to be extraordinarily heavy; but it did not render it an extraordinary
disbursement. The case is similar to that of an ordinary sailing ship, in
which, owing to disasters, the voyage is unusually protracted, and
consequently the owner's disbursements for provisions, and for the wages
of his crew, if they are paid by the month, are extraordinarily heavy. It is
not similar to that of the master hiring extra hands to pump when his crew
are unable to keep the ship afloat, or any other expenditure which is not
only extraordinary in its amount, but is incurred to procure some service
extraordinary in its nature".(55)
(55) (1867) LR 2 QB 203, at p 212.
Yet there may be circumstances in which the shipowner is under a duty to incur general average (i.e.,
extraordinary) expenditure and it follows that the test proposed in Wilson v. Bank of Victoria cannot be
universally valid. If a ship is involved in a collision as a result of which she loses power and is making
water, her owners remain under an obligation to take reasonable care of the cargo, and the performance of
this obligation might well require the making of a towage contract. For the owners to refuse to enter into
such a contract, if practicable, would then be a breach of duty, but no one would doubt that the
remuneration payable under the contract was extraordinary expenditure. Extraordinary expenditure is fore
probably best defined as expenditure incurred on an extraordinary occasion, in order to preserve the
adventure from peril, which involves more than expenditure to pay for consumption of ship's stores or
materials for their usual purpose, even though in an unusual amount.
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We will discuss, first, expenditures incurred in rescuing the ship and cargo
when they are at sea, or after the ship has stranded or sunk; and, later expenses
incurred in putting into port of refuge for the general safety.
i) Salvage Costs
The expense of rescuing a ship from disaster so it may complete its
intended voyage is a clear example of general average expenditure.(56)
In Kemp v. Halliday,(57)during a voyage from Liverpool to Rio de Janeiro,
the ship encountered severe weather and had to put into Falmouth for the safety
of the ship and cargo and, in so doing, sustained a general average loss. In order
to carry out repairs, part of the cargo had to be discharged, but, whilst the
repairs were being carried out, a violent storm hit Falmouth and the ship, with
the portion of cargo still aboard her, sank at her moorings. The shipowner
claimed for a constructive total loss, although the ship's agents, acting on their
own initiative, later raised the ship together with the remaining cargo left on
board.
The case turned on whether, in estimating the cost of repairs, the cost of
raising and salvaging the sunken ship and her cargo amounted to a general
average act and whether, if it was a general average act, the general average
contributions payable by cargo interests should or should not be deducted
from the total cost of repairs.
The Exchequer Chamber held that the raising and salving of the ship
amounted to a general average act, because both ship and cargo were in
imminent danger of becoming a total loss. "We" said Erle C.J. "infer from the
statement in the case that there was a common peril of destruction imminent
over the ship and cargo as they lay submerged, that the most convenient mode
of saving either ship or cargo or both was by raising the ship together with the
cargo, that the expense required for such raising would be an extraordinary
expense for the common benefit of both, that the cargo would be liable for a
general average contribution towards that expense, and that the shipowner

Where the YAR apply, several of the numbered rules permit the allowance of expenditure which is not
abnormal in kind, but only in degree, for example crew wages during the prolongation of the voyage
occasioned by entering and leaving a port of refuge, and fuel costs and port charges at a port of refuge are
allowed under Rule XI.
(56) See EMC, Article 342/2(i).
'General average shall include in particular...the costs of the salvage and towage of the ship.'
(57) (1866) LR 1 QB 520
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would have a lien on the cargo to secure the payment of that general
average."(58)
Complex salvage operations
Suppose a ship with her cargo has been stranded, and the ship and
cargo have been brought into safety by a series of connected, though
distinct, operations; for example, the first operation being discharging
and landing the cargo, the second being attempts to tow the ship off
the strand, which, in the event of failure, is followed by the third
operation of digging out a channel to facilitate the refloating, In such
circumstances the question arises: How is it to be determined whether
the entire cost of those operations, from their commencement to their
termination, should be treated as general average, or whether the
charges should be apportioned and allocated specifically to the property saved
by each distinct stage in the operations?
This issue is illustrated by a number of cases, the first of which to
be considered is that of Job v. Langton.(59) In that case a ship on a voyage
with cargo from Liverpool to St. John's, N.F., stranded off the coast of
Ireland. The whole of the cargo was discharged and taken to Dublin,
where it was placed in store. A channel was then cut, and by this
means, and with the assistance of a tug, the ship was refloated and
towed to Liverpool for repairs. The question was, whether the expenses incurred
in getting off the ship and taking her to Liverpool to repair, after the
entire cargo was discharged, were chargeable to general average, or to particular
average on the ship alone. Lord Campbell, delivering the
judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, pronounced that the expenses
were not chargeable to general average, but to the ship alone.

(58) (1866) LR 1 QB 520, at p. 527. Blacburn J. said at p. 242:
"In order to give rise to a charge as general average, it is essential that there should be a voluntary
sacrifice to preserve more subjects than one exposed to a common jeopardy; but an extraordinary
expenditure incurred for that purpose is as much a sacrifice as if, instead of money being expended
for the purpose, money's worth were thrown away. It is immaterial whether the shipowner sacrifices a
cable or an anchor to get the ship off a shoal, or pays the worth of it to hire those extra services which
get her off. It is quite true, that so long as the expenditure by the shipowner is merely such as he
should incur in the fulfilment of his ordinary duties as shipowner, it cannot be general average; but
the expenditure in raising a submerged ship with cargo is extraordinary expenditure, and is, if
incurred to save the cargo as well as the ship (which, prima facie, is the object of such an
expenditure), chargeable against all the subjects in jeopardy saved by this expenditure".
(59) (1856) 6 E. & B. 779.
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"The expenses, to constitute general average, must therefore be
brought within the second category, 'extraordinary expenses incurred for
the joint benefit of ship and cargo ....' Although the stranding was
fortuitous, all expenses incurred from the misadventure till all the cargo
had been discharged confessedly constituted general average. But how can
it be said that the subsequent expenses in getting off the ship and taking
her to Liverpool for repair were of the same character? The employment
of the steam-tug, and the cutting of the channel by which the ship was
rescued cannot, as was contended for, be part of the same operation as the
unloading of the cargo; for the case expressly finds that 'the steam-tug did
no work at the ship until after the cargo was landed, and the coals and
ballast taken out of her.' We therefore, do not see how these expenses are
to be distinguished from the expenses of repairing the ship when she had
been brought to Liverpool, which, it is admitted, must fall exclusively on
the owner of the ship or the underwriter on the ship, as particular average.
If the owner of the ship was to earn the stipulated freight by carrying the
cargo to Newfoundland, it was his duty to repair her and to carry her to a
place where she might be repaired..."
But, in the case of Moran v. Jones(60) which tried in the same court in the
following year, Job v. Langton was distinguished. In that case the facts were
that the ship, shortly after sailing from Liverpool for Callao, ran aground on
East Hoyle Bank. She was in ballast, under charter to fetch a cargo from the
Chinchas on which the freight was at risk; but she had on board, by the
charterer's permission, a small quantity of goods belonging to other parties.
Two days after she ran ashore, the weather being more moderate, assistance
was procured from Liverpool, and men were employed saving from alongside
the wreck of the ship's foremast which had been cut away, the materials of the
ship, and the goods, all of which were sent in lighters to Liverpool. Afterwards,
a stream anchor was carried out, the ship was scuttled, about 300 tons of ballast
were thrown overboard, and then the ship, being kept free by pumping, floated,
She was then towed by two steamers back to Liverpool, and there repaired. The
question raised was, whether the sum of £643, which had been expended after
the cargo was taken out, for the purpose of floating the ship and bringing her to
Liverpool for repair, should be treated as general average. Lord Campbell,
delivering the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, said that the expenses
were chargeable to general average:

(60) (1857) 7 E. & B. 523.
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"In this case we never doubted that the defendant, as underwriter on
the freight was liable for a contribution to general average in respect of the
sum of £643, the expenses incurred in order to get the ship off from the
bank on which she was stranded, whether the goods were or were not
liable to contribute to this portion of the loss. It is admitted that the ship
could not have been got off and completed her voyage unless these
various expenses had been incurred. Therefore, without these expenses,
there would have been a total loss of the freight, amounting to the sum of
£6,750 ...
But the sum for which this defendant is liable will depend, to a certain
degree, upon the question whether, under the circumstances stated, these
goods are to contribute in respect of the £643. And upon this question
likewise we are bound to give our opinion. The goods had been taken
from the ship and put on board a lighter before these expenses were
incurred; and if this had been a separate operation by which they were
intended to be saved for the benefit of the owner of the goods, we should
have thought (as in Job v. Langton) that the goods were not liable to
contribute to the expenses subsequently incurred. Looking, however, to
the facts stated in this special case, it seems to us that the act of putting the
goods in the lighter was only part of one continuous operation, viz, getting
the ship off the bank on which she was stranded, and sending her to
Liverpool, where she might be repaired with a view
to prosecute the original adventure. When she got to Liverpool, the
operation of saving her from shipwreck was completed, and the whole
expense of the repairs fell upon the owner as owner, and must be borne by
him in that capacity, or by the underwriters on the ship: but the expenses
of this continuous operation, for the common benefit of ship, goods and
freight, are the subject of a general average. In Job v. Langton, we
considered that the goods had been saved by a distinct and completed
operation, and that afterwards a new operation began which could not be
properly distinguished from the repairs done to the ship to enable her to
pursue the voyage. . .. But in the case on which we have now to
adjudicate, the goods were put into a lighter by the master of the ship,
along with materials of the ship saved from the wreck and they remained
in the custody and under the control of the master till the ship was
repaired, when they were reloaded in the ship and carried forward, without
any interference by the owner of the goods, to their destined port. Unless
it had been intended that an operation should be undertaken and
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completed by which both ship and goods should be rescued from the peril
to which they were exposed nothing might have been done and the goods
might have perished. Because the goods happened to be saved in the
earliest
part
of
the
operation,
this
can
be
no
sufficient reason for saying that they ought not to contribute to all the
expenses of the operation which contemplated the benefit of all the
interests imperilled by the stranding.... "
In the latter case of Walthew v. Mavrojani (61)a ship laden with cargo
for London broke from her moorings in a storm at Calcutta and was
driven fast aground on a mud-bank. In the surveyor's opinion
refloating was impossible. It was therefore recommended that the
cargo should be discharged and the ship dismantled. However,
when the cargo had been discharged and safely warehoused in Calcutta, further
efforts
by extraordinary means
were
made to
refloat
the
ship. Finally, after the first attempt had been abandoned, a fresh
contract was made for an embankment to be constructed round the ship in the
form of a dock which was then filled with water enabling the successful
refloating of the ship. The cost of this contract to refloat the ship was held both
in the Court of Exchequer and unanimously on appeal not to be general average.
Under EMC, Article 342/2(d) and YAR, Rule VIII, the cost of lightening a
ship that has gone ashore, by removal of its fuel, stores or cargo, as well as any
damage done in the process is admissible in general average.(62) More generally,
YAR, Rule VI admits expenses 'in the nature of salvage, whether under contract
or otherwise,' as general average expenditures provided '(they are) carried out
for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in the common
maritime adventure.'(63)
(61) (1870) L.R. 5 Ex. 116.
(62) EMC, Article 342/2(d) reads as follows:
'General average shall include in particular...expenditures incurred in the event forced stranding to
lighten the ship, to hire the barges for such purpose and to reload the goods on the ship.'
YAR, Rule VIII reads as follows:
'When a ship is ashore and cargo and ship's fuel and stores or any of them are discharged as a general
average act, the extra cost of lightening, lighter hire and reshipping (if incurred), and any loss or damage to
the property involved in the common maritime adventure in consequence thereof, shall be admitted as
general average'.
(63) Rule VI was introduced in YAR, 1974 to deal with a difference in practice between the United
Kingdom, and the United States and Europe over the inclusion of salvage payments in general average.
Since the case of The Raisby (1885) 10 P.D. 114, English practice was to exclude the cost of salvage
services rendered by volunteers, as opposed to those incurred contractually. The effect of Rule VI has been
to bring English practice into line with existing U.S. practice, which has long held that amounts paid for
salvage, however obtained, are admissible in general average.(63)
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ii) Temporary Repair
The cost of necessary permanent repairs to the ship is not admissible
in general average because they are an incidental part of the shipowner's
responsibility to prosecute the voyage, unless the damage was sustained by a
general average sacrifice. However, temporary repairs are a general average
expenditure when made for the safe completion of the voyage or to enable the
ship to reach a port where proper repairs can be effected,(64) because, in

Rule VI has been amended in YAR 1990, to reads as follows:
'(a) Expenditure incurred by the parties to the adventure in the nature of salvage, whether under contract or
otherwise, shall be allowed in general average provided that the salvage operations were carried out for the
purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in the common maritime adventure (taken over
from the previous rule VI).
Expenditure allowed in general average shall include any salvage remuneration in which the skill and
efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimizing damage to the environment such as referred to in Article
13 paragraph 1(b) of the International Convention on Salvage, 1989, have been taken into account.
(b) Special compensation payable to a salvor by the shipowner under Article 14 of the said Convention to
the extent specified in paragraph 4 of that Article or under any other provision similar in substance shall
not be allowed in general average.'
This amended Rule VI is the result of the amendment to the International Convention on Salvage which
itself resulted in the amended LOF 1990. It includes possible rewards for salvors who prevented oil
pollution or other damage to the environment, even if at the end of their intervention, they were not
successful in their salvage attempts. In that case they will still be entitled to a remuneration
refund of the expenses made in order to avoid damage to the environment.
However, under the YAR 2004 salvage payments and associated costs lie where they fall, and are not
allowed in general average. Rule VI of the YAR 2004 is directed to salvage payments of the kind referred
to in the International Convention on Salvage 1989, i.e., where the remuneration is fixed according to the
success of the operation, and where the owners of the salved property contribute to the payment in
proportion to salved values. Rule VI does not exclude from general average payments made under a
contract for services, such as towage, where these features are absent. Rules VI reads as follows:
'SALVAGE REMUNERATION
a. Salvage payments, including interest thereon and legal fees associated with such payments, shall lie
where they fall and shall not be allowed in general average, save only that if one party to the salvage shall
have paid all or any of the proportion of salvage (including interest and legal fees) due from another party
(calculated on the basis of salved values and not general average contributory values), the unpaid
contribution to salvage due from that other party shall be credited in the adjustment to the party that has
paid it, and debited to the party on whose behalf the payment was made.
b. Salvage payments referred to in paragraph (a) above shall include any salvage remuneration in which
the skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimising damage to the environment such as is
referred to in Article 13 paragraph 1(b) of the International Convention on Salvage 1989 have been taken
into account.
c. Special compensation payable to a salvor by the shipowner under Article 14 of the said Convention to
the extent specified in paragraph 4 of that Article or under any other provision similar in substance (such as
SCOPIC) shall not be allowed in general average and shall not be considered a salvage payment as referred
to in paragraph (a) of this Rule.'
(64) YAR, Rule XIV and Rule X(a). Rule XIV provides that:
'Temporary repairs.
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principle, they do not add value to the ship. But the extent of inclusion in
general average of temporary repairs of accidental, as opposed to sacrificial,
damage may be limited by reference to the savings in expenses that otherwise
would have had to be incurred.
iii) Port of Refuge Expenses
A ship that is forced to seek a port of refuge in the course of its voyage may
also claim some of the expenses it incurs there in general average.(65) However,
it is not sufficient that the expenses should have been incurred for the common
benefit of the ship and cargo; they must either themselves fall within the
definition of a general average sacrifice, or, if not in themselves a general
average sacrifice, be nevertheless caused or rendered necessary by one. (66) In
Societe Nouvelle d'Armement v. Spillers and Bakers Ltd,(67) the ship Ernest
Legouve, chartered to take grain from San Francisco to Queenstown, thence
to Sharpness, was in Queenstown on May 20, 1915, when bodies from the
ship Lusitania were brought to land. On May 26 there was a meeting of the
crew, and the master was persuaded to take a tow across the Irish Sea to

Where temporary repairs are effected to a ship at a port of loading, call or refuge, for the common safety,
or of damage caused by general average sacrifice, the cost of such repairs shall be admitted as general
average.
Where temporary repairs of accidental damage are effected in order to enable the adventure to be
completed, the cost of such repairs shall be admitted as general average without regard to the saving, if
any, to other interests, but only up to the saving in expense which would have been incurred and allowed in
general average if such repairs had not been effected there.
No deductions "new for old" shall be made from the cost of temporary repairs allowable as general
average."
Rule X (a) provides that:
'When a ship shall have entered a port or place of refuge or shall have returned to her port or place of
loading in consequence of accident, sacrifice or other extraordinary circumstances which render that
necessary for the common safety, the expenses of entering such port or place shall be admitted as general
average; and when she shall have sailed thence with her original cargo, or a part of it, the corresponding
expenses of leaving such port or place of refuge consequent upon such entry or return shall likewise be
admitted as general average.
When a ship is at any port or place of refuge and is necessarily removed to another port or place because
repairs cannot be carried out in the first port or place, the provisions of this Rule shall be applied to the
second port or place as if it were a port or place of refuge and the cost of such removal including
temporary repairs and towage shall be admitted as general average. The provisions of Rule XI shall be
applied to the prolongation of the voyage occasioned by such removal.'
(65) See EMC, Article 342/2 (f).
(66) In Hamel v. P. & O. S.N. Co.[1908] 2 K.B.298 owners of cargo claimed contribution in general average in
respect of damage suffered by the cargo during unloading; the unloading was necessary for the purpose of repairing
particular average damage suffered by the ship, by which, until repaired, she was rendered unfit to prosecute the
voyage. Lord Alverstone C.J., having found as a fact that there was no common peril of ship and cargo, held that the
plaintiffs' claim was unfounded.
(67) [1917]1 KB 865.
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Sheerness because of the danger of enemy submarines. The weather was
fine. The usual practice for sailing ships was to take a tow in and out of
port. The court held that the expenditure on towage was not general average.
Although the expenditure was unusual, or extraordinary, the risk or danger, in
1915, of submarine attack, particularly on sailing ships, was slight and not out
of the ordinary as a risk.
Sankey J. stated, in delivering the judgment of the court:
"Extraordinary expenditure must to some extent be connected with an
extraordinary occasion. For example, an abnormal user of the engines and
an abnormal consumption of coal in endeavouring to refloat a steamship
stranded in a position of peril is an extraordinary sacrifice and an
extraordinary expenditure: see The Bona. A mere extra user of coal,
however, in order to accelerate the speed of a ship would not be a general
average act. Again, suppose the master, instead of hiring a tug, had
purchased guns and hired a crew of gunners at Queenstown on the chance
that he might be attacked by a submarine. I doubt if the expenses of the
guns and gunners could have been recovered as a general average
expenditure: see Taylor v Curtis ... It is not sufficient to say that the
expenditure was incurred to benefit the property; it must be proved that it
was abnormal in kind or degree and incurred to preserve the property".(68)
The EMC and YAR allow charges for entering or leaving the port of refuge
and the cost of handling, moving, and storing any of the cargo, fuel, or
stores.(69)They also include the extra wages and maintenance costs of the ship's
(68) [1917] 1 KB 865, at p 870. In Power v. Whitmore (1815) 4 M. & S. 141. the ship being in heavy
weather, and having been damaged, put into Cowes to repair, as a measure necessary for safety of ship and
cargo. She put in on December 7 and remained till the 11th, when, having repaired, she sailed on her
voyage; but she returned to Cowes next day, owing to adverse winds and bad weather, and was detained
there by the winds till the 29th. General average contribution was claimed in respect of the wages and
provisions from the time of first putting in until the final sailing. But the claim was disallowed. Lord
Ellenborough said: "General average must lay its foundation in a sacrifice of part for the sake of the rest,
but here was no sacrifice of any part by the master, but only .of his time and patience."
(69) See YAR, Rule X which states that:
'Expenses at port of refuge etc.
a) When a ship shall have entered a port or place of refuge or shall have returned to her port or place of
loading in consequence of accident, sacrifice or other extraordinary circumstances which render that
necessary for the common safety, the expenses of entering such port or place shall be admitted as general
average; and when she shall have sailed thence with her original cargo, or a part of it, the corresponding
expenses of leaving such port or place of refuge consequent upon such entry or return shall likewise be
admitted as general average.
When a ship is at any port or place of refuge and is necessarily removed to another port or place because
repairs cannot be carried out in the first port or place, the provisions of this Rule shall be applied to the
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crew,(70) fuel, and stores consumed, and port charges incurred consequent on the
prolongation of the voyage or the detention of the ship in port of refuge as a
result of an accident or a sacrifice en route.(71)
second port or place as if it were a port or place of refuge and the cost of such removal including
temporary repairs and towage shall be admitted as general average. The provisions of Rule XI shall be
applied to the prolongation of the voyage occasioned by such removal.
(b) The cost of handling on board or discharging cargo, fuel or stores whether at a port or place of loading,
call or refuge, shall be admitted as general average, when the handling or discharge was necessary for the
common safety or to enable damage to the ship caused by sacrifice or accident to be repaired, if the repairs
were necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage, except in cases where the damage to the ship is
discovered at a port or place of loading or call without any accident or other extraordinary circumstances
connected with such damage having taken place during the voyage.
The cost of handling on board or discharging cargo, fuel or stores shall not be admissible as general
average when incurred solely for the purpose of restowage due to shifting during the voyage, unless such
restowage is necessary for the common safety.
(c) Whenever the cost of handling or discharging cargo, fuel or stores is admissible as general average, the
costs of storage, including insurance if reasonably incurred, reloading and stowing of such cargo, fuel or
stores shall likewise be admitted as general average. The provisions of Rule XI shall be applied to the extra
period of detention occasioned by such reloading or restowing.
But when the ship is condemned or does not proceed on her original voyage, storage expenses shall be
admitted as general average only up to the date of the ship's condemnation or of the abandonment of the
voyage or up to the date of completion of discharge of cargo if the condemnation or abandonment takes
place before that date'.
At common law, there has been uncertainty as to the extent to which associated costs can be allowed in
general average. These consist mainly of the inward and outward port charges, and the costs of unloading
and warehousing cargo. In Atwood v. Sellar (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 286), the Court of Appeal allowed all of these
costs in general average when the ship was forced into a port of refuge in consequence of a general average
incident. In contrast, in Svendsen v. Wallace (1885) 10 App Cas, the ship was forced into the port of
refuge in consequence of a particular average incident. The House of Lords allowed only the inward
charges and the costs of discharging cargo as general average. They reasoned that, after this point, the
cargo was safe, and further expenditure could not therefore be said to relate to the common safety of both
ship and cargo.
However, the conflict between these authorities has lost much of its importance, due to the widespread use
of the YAR. Rule X, as we have seen, allows as general average all of the costs associated with a port of
refuge" and does not require a general average incident to have been the cause of the ship having to seek
refuge.
Where, however, a ship on her voyage, in consequence of damage not the subject of a general average
contribution, such as springing a leak, puts into a port of refuge, and, in order to repair the ship, the cargo
is necessarily landed, the expenses of reloading the cargo to enable the ship to prosecute her voyage are not
the subject of a general average contribution from the cargo (see Svendsen v. Wallace (1884) 13 Q.B.D.
69) nor is damage to the cargo sustained in discharging it, in order to repair the ship, the cargo being in no
danger (see Hamet v. P. & O. Co. [1908] 2 K.B. 298)
(70) Rule XI. Wages and maintenance of crew and other expenses bearing up for and in a port of
refuge, etc.:
'(a) Wages and maintenance of master, officers and crew reasonably incurred and fuel and stores
consumed during the prolongation of the voyage occasioned by a ship entering a port or place of refuge or
returning to her port or place of loading shall be admitted as general average when the expenses of entering
such port or place are allowable in general average in accordance with Rule X(a).
(b) When a ship shall have entered or been detained in any port or place in consequence of accident,
sacrifice or other extraordinary circumstances which render that necessary for the common safety, or to
enable damage to the ship caused by sacrifice or accident to be repaired, if the repairs were necessary for
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EMC, Article 342/2 and YAR, Rule X allow as general average all of the
costs associated with a port of refuge(72) and do not require a general average
incident to have been the cause of the ship having to seek refuge(73). The effect
the safe prosecution of the voyage, the wages and maintenance of the master, officers, and crew reasonably
incurred during the extra period of detention in such port or place until the ship shall or should have been
made ready to proceed upon her voyage, shall be admitted in general average.
Provided that when damage to the ship is discovered at a port or place of loading or call without any
accident or other extraordinary circumstance connected with such damage having taken place during the
voyage, then the wages and maintenance of master, officers and crew and fuel and stores consumed during
the extra detention for repairs to damage so discovered shall not be admissible as general average, even if
the repairs are necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage.
When the ship is condemned or does not proceed on her original voyage, wages and maintenance of the
master, officers and crew and fuel and stores consumed shall be admitted as general average only up to the
date of the ship's condemnation or of the abandonment of the voyage or up to the date of completion of
discharge of cargo if the condemnation or abandonment takes place before that date.
Fuel and stores consumed during the extra period of detention shall be admitted as general average, except
such fuel and stores as are consumed in effecting repairs not allowable in general average.
Port charges incurred during the extra period of detention shall likewise be admitted as general average
except such charges as are incurred solely by reason of repairs not allowable in general average.
(c) For the purpose of this and the other Rules wages shall include all payments made to or for the benefit
of the master, officers and crew, whether such payments be imposed by law upon the shipowners or be
made under the terms or articles of employment.
(d) When overtime is paid to the master, officers or crew for maintenance of the ship or repairs, the cost of
which is not allowable in general average, such overtime shall be allowed in general average only up to the
saving in expense which would have been incurred and admitted as general average, had such overtime not
been incurred'.
Under the YAR 2004, Rule XI wages incurred in putting into the port of refuge are allowed, but those
incurred while the ship is at the port are excluded. Rule XI reads as follows:
'WAGES AND MAINTENANCE OF CREW AND OTHER EXPENSES PUTTING IN TO AND AT
A PORT OF REFUGE, ETC.
a. Wages and maintenance of master, officers and crew reasonably incurred and fuel and stores consumed
during the prolongation of the voyage occasioned by a ship entering a port or place of refuge or returning
to her port or place of loading shall be allowed as general average when the expenses of entering such port
or place are allowable as general average in accordance with Rule X(a).
b. For the purpose of this and the other Rules wages shall include all payments made to or for the benefit of
the master, officers and crew, whether such payments be imposed by law upon the shipowners or be made
under the terms of articles of employment'.
(71) EMC, Article 342/2(h) provides that:
'General average shall include in particular... the wages of the master and crew and the value of the fuel
and stores consumed during the prolongation of the voyage occasioned by a ship entering a port or place
of refuge for protection or for repairs to be carried out shall be considered to be general average
provided that this is within a reasonable period for the ship to be in proper condition to continue the
voyage.'
Once the ship has reached her final destination, even though cargo remains on board, such expenses cannot
be allowed under YAR, the numbered Rules, and can only be allowed under Rule A, if incurred for the
common safety: Trade Green Shipping v. Securitas Bremer (The Trade Green) [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
451.
(72) Or a second port of refuge if repairs cannot be effected at the first place.
(73) However, YAR, Rule X (b) excludes costs incurred solely for restowage due to shifting during the
voyage, unless such restowage is necessary for the common safety.

[Journal of Sharia &Law ]

Published by Scholarworks@UAEU, 2014

[College of Law UAE University]

22

31

Journal Sharia and Law, Vol. 2014, No. 58 [2014], Art. 8

[Dr. Abdulla Hassan Mohamed]
of the EMC, Article 342/2 and YAR, Rule of Interpretation is that these costs
can amount to general average, even though they might not be covered by the
definition of general average in EMC, Article 342/1 and YAR, Rule A(74).
Furthermore, EMC, Article 342/2(h) and YAR, Rule XI allow the shipowner
the additional wage and fuel costs caused by the prolongation of the voyage,
due to the stay at the port of refuge. Recovery under EMC, Article 342/2 and
YAR, Rule Xl is not, however, possible in respect of costs incurred at the port
of discharge. In The Trade Green,(75) no recovery was allowed under this rule in
respect of tug costs incurred when a fire broke out on the ship during discharge,
which led to the port authority ordering tugs to remove her from the berth. The
shipowners
attempted
to
claim such costs as 'port charges' under Rule XI (b). However, their argument
tailed, as they first had to show that the ship had been 'detained' in the port by
reason of repairs necessary for 'the safe prosecution of the voyage', which they
were unable to establish as the voyage had terminated at the time that the fire
broke out consequently, their only prospect of recovering these costs in general
average would have been under Rule A. For the purpose of this rule, the
'common maritime adventure' would still have been afoot at the time of the fire.
However, recovery would still not have been possible as the tug assistance
could not be described as having been for the common benefit of the ship and
cargo, as the fire could more readily have been extinguished had the ship stayed
at berth.
If the ship is condemned or the voyage abandoned, no costs incurred after
that date are allowable under either rule. Rule XII allows damage to cargo when
damage results from operations at the port of refuge, where the cost of such
operations is itself allowable as general average under Rules X or XI.
iv) Environmental Costs
The 1994 and 2004 Rules contain provisions which restrict the right to
recover in general average any costs, damages or expenses incurred in respect of
damage to the environment or in consequence of the escape or release of
pollutants from the property involved in the common maritime adventure. Rule
C prima facie excludes all such claims, but this exclusion takes effect subject to
the specific provisions of the numbered Rules. Of these, Rule XI (d) of the 1994
and 2004 Rules contains elaborate provisions the effect of which is to allow
(74) In Vlassopoulos v British and Foreign Ml (The Makis) [1929]1 KB 187, decided prior to the
adoption of the Rule of Interpretation, a claim under Rule X was disallowed for this very reason.
(75) [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 451, QB.
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most kinds of expense incurred in avoiding or minimising pollution or damage
to the environment. Overall, the effect is that the expenses of ensuring that
pollution or damage to the environment resulting from a general average act is
eliminated or kept to a minimum are allowable, but that the costs of cleaning up
pollution or making good damage which has already occurred are excluded, as
are the costs of meeting good claims by third parties in respect of such damage.
Rule XI (d) reads as follows:
'The cost of measures undertaken to prevent or minimise damage to
the environment shall be allowed in general average when incurred in any
or all of the following circumstances:
(i) as part of an operation performed for the common safety which, had
it been undertaken by a party outside the common maritime adventure,
would have entitled such party to a salvage reward;
(ii) as a condition of entry into or departure from any port or place in
the circumstances prescribed in Rule X(a);
(iii) as a condition of remaining at any port or place in the
circumstances prescribed in Rule X(a), provided that when there is an
actual escape or release of pollutant substances the cost of any additional
measures required on that account to prevent or minimise pollution or
environmental damage shall not be allowed as general average;
(iv) necessarily in connection with the discharging, storing or
reloading of cargo whenever the cost of those operations is admissible as
general average.'
v) Substituted Expenses
It sometimes happens that expenses at a port of refuge, which would be
general average, can be avoided by adopting a course which will be more
economical, on the whole, but which will involve a loss or expenditure that
would not ordinarily be contributed to. When, for example, a ship is at a port of
refuge in a damaged condition, it may be possible, by adopting an alternative
course, to avoid the expense which would be entailed by repairing her there. For
instance, suppose a ship is at a port of refuge where, in order to repair her, it
would be necessary to discharge the whole of her cargo, warehouse it, and
subsequently reload it. It might be possible, as an alternative course, to tow her
to her port of destination at considerably less expense than would be entailed by
discharging, warehousing and reloading the cargo. In these circumstances the
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alternative course would be prudently and rightly adopted, and the expenditure
would be called a 'substituted expense', which would be apportioned in the same
ratio as the expenditure that would have been borne by the various parties had
the more expensive course been followed.
The "substituted expenses" are regulated by EMC, Article 346 which states
"(Free translation) expenses incurred instead of other expenses which could
have been regarded as general average shall be regarded as general average
had they been extended up to up to the amount of the general average expense
avoided "(76) They are also regulated by Rule F of the YAR: 'Any additional
expenses incurred in place of another expense which would have been allowed
in general average shall be deemed to be general average and so allowed
without regard to the saving, if any, to other interests, but only up to the amount
of the general average expense avoided.' In practice most substituted expenses
are those incurred with a view to reducing port of refuge expenses which would
have been incurred and allowed under EMC, Article 342/2 (f,g,h) and YAR,
Rules X and XI. Some examples of substituted expenses are towage of the ship
from a port of refuge to its destination, transshipment and forwarding of the
cargo from a port of refuge to destination, drydocking of the ship in the port of
refuge with cargo on board, and temporary repairs.(77) The additional expense
may only be substituted for general average expenditures that are thereby
avoided. They may not be accounted against ordinary ship's costs of the voyage.
Therefore, towing the disabled ship to destination or forwarding the cargo there
(76) EMC, Article 250/3 reads in Arabic as follows:

"تعتبر خسارة مشتركة المصاريف التي انفقت عوضاً عن مصاريف أخرى كان من الممكن اعتبارها من الخسائر
".المشتركة لو أنها انفقت وذلك في حدود مبلغ المصاريف التي لم تنفق

(77) See The Bijela [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. I where the ship was engaged on a voyage from Providence to
Kandla and grounded shortly after sailing. She put into Jamestown, the nearest anchorage, and was faced
with the choice of either effecting temporary repairs there, or discharging the cargo into barges while she
proceeded to New York for permanent repairs, for which there were no suitable facilities at either
Providence or Jamestown. The shipowners chose the former option, which cost US $282,000, whereas the
latter option would have resulted in general average expenditure of US $535,000.
Cargo owners submitted that, in making the calculation required by Rule XIV, one was forced to the
conclusion that there had been no saving in general average as a result of the temporary repairs. This is
because, had permanent repairs been undertaken in New York, the associated costs would not have been
allowable in general average under Rule X(b) as those repairs would not have been 'necessary for the safe
prosecution of the voyage', which could have been achieved by temporary repairs in Jamestown.
This very literalist argument was accepted at first instance and by the Court of Appeal. However, the
House of Lords adopted a more purposive approach and found for the shipowner. Lord Lloyd held that, for
the purposes of the comparison required by Rule XIV, the only assumption that needed to be made in
construing Rule X (b) was that temporary repairs were not, in fact, made. On that assumption, repairs at
New York would have been necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage and the port of refuge costs
there would have been allowable in general average. As these exceeded the actual cost of the temporary
repairs, it followed that the cost of the latter must be allowable under Rule XlV.
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separately are ordinarily the price the shipowner must pay for earning the
freight;(78) but when such measures replace the need to make general average
expenditures, their cost may fairly be set off against the expenses that would
otherwise have been made.(79) Even so, as Article 346 and Rule F state, these
substituted expenses are allowed only up to the amount of general average
expenditure thereby saved. Further, only expenses and not losses may be
substituted. EMC, Article 346 and YAR, Rule F also state that no account will
be taken of any saving that might be occasioned to other interests, such as a
reduction in the shipowners cost of repairs.
2.2. INTENTIONALLY AND REASONABLY INCURRED
To qualify as general average an extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure
must be intentionally and reasonably made or incurred.(80)
2.2.1. Intentionally made or incurred
The sacrifice or expenditure must be made or incurred intentionally or
deliberately. The act must be the result of the exercise of reasoning power
and discretion, directed to the particular problem of saving the ship and
cargo concerned.(81)A sacrifice or an expenditure, which in given
circumstances becomes inevitable, does not give rise to a claim in general
(78) See YAR, Rule VI (a), paras.2 and (b).
(79) See The Bona [1895] P. 125 CA where the ship was grounded on Galveston Bar for three days and
eventually got herself off by using her own engines. It was calculated that 52 tons of coal were used in
those three days that would not be used in ordinary steaming. A claim was made for contribution in respect
of the damage to the engines and the cost of the coal, against which it was argued that there was nothing
abnormal in the nature of the user of the ship's appliances, though the circumstances were no doubt
extraordinary. It was held, however, that to use engines by working them ahead and astern while the ship
was fast on a bank, instead of being afloat, was a use for which they were never intended, and that the
engines having been intentionally put to such a use in order to rescue ship and cargo from danger, both the
injury to the engines and the extra coal consumed must be contributed for.
Cf. Power v. Whitmore (1815) 4 M.&.S. 141. a ship was in imminent danger of being driven ashore during
a gale, and in order to avoid this danger was stood out to sea with a press of sail greater than she was able
to bear in such weather, with the result that serious damage was sustained to the masts, sails and the hull
itself. It was held, as counsel for the shipowners had admitted in argument that no part of this damage was
the subject of general average.
(80) EMC, Article 246/1; YAR, Rule A.
(81) One of the best examples of a voluntary sacrifice was the stranding of the ship in Barnard v. Adams
51 U.S. (10 How.) 270 (1850). Caught in a heavy rainstorm with thunder and lightning, the acting master
intentionally stranded the ship on a comparatively safe shore to avoid the virtually certain destruction of
the ship upon a rocky and more dangerous part of the shore. The court explained the requirement for a
voluntary sacrifice thus:
"The necessity of the case must compel him to choose between the loss of the whole and part; but however
metaphysicians may stumble at the assertion, it is this forced choice which is necessary to justify the
master in making a sacrifice (as it is called) of any part for the whole."
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average.(82) Only when the loss is intentionally incurred may it amount to
general average. In Papayanni and Jeromia v. Grampian Steamship Co
Ltd.(83)a ship which was on fire was intentionally scuttled under orders of the
captain of the port, the court still decided that it amounted to a general average
sacrifice. In that case the facts were that the cargo-owners shipped a cargo with
the shipowners in their ship under bills of lading which incorporated the YAR
1890; Rule III of which stated: 'Extinguishing fire on shipboard: Damage done
to ship and cargo, or either of them, by water or otherwise ... in extinguishing a
fire on board the ship, shall be made good as general average.' During the
voyage, a fire developed in the ship's bunkers and she was, in the interests of all
concerned, put into a nearby port for assistance. However, the captain of the
port, to whom intimation of the state of affairs had been given, ordered the ship
to be scuttled in the interest of safety, and the cargo was effectively destroyed.
The cargo-owners then claimed a general average contribution from the
shipowners.
The court ruled that, although the scuttling was intentional, it still amounted
to a voluntary act for the benefit of all, and, therefore, the cargo-owners were
entitled to recover in general average. The court said:
"This evidence shows that what was done was in the interest of ship
and cargo. There is no evidence that there was any other motive for
scuttling the ship. The captain, who had not parted with the possession of
his ship, did not object. There seems to be clear evidence that he
sanctioned what was done. The loss must be adjusted as a general average
sacrifice."(84)

(82) See the Explanatory Note to the Draft of the Emirati Maritime Code, p.108:
It is submitted that an action which is forced upon the master cannot be said to be voluntary and is not
accountable as a general average act. Thus in Athel Line v. Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance
[1944] K.B. 87. two ships of the plaintiff line, sailing in convoy from Bermuda to the United Kingdom,
put back to Bermuda under order of the convoy commodore. These orders were pursuant to Admiralty
instructions, owing to the convoy ahead having been attacked by an enemy raider with considerable loss
thereto. The plaintiffs' ships lost six days on their voyage and extra fuel and stores were consumed.
Accordingly the plaintiffs claimed from their War Risk underwriters the ships' contribution towards these
expenses in general average under Rules A and X (a) of the York-Antwerp Rules 1924. Tucker J. held that
the language of Rule A was inappropriate to cover mere obedience to lawful orders of a superior authority,
and that the plaintiffs could not rely upon the acts of the masters of the ships as general average acts. He
also decided that the plaintiffs could not rely upon the acts of (a) the commodore or (b) the Admiralty, as
in his view of the facts the orders were given as part of the general naval and strategic dispositions in the
North Atlantic, and not for the sole purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in the
adventures in the plaintiffs' two ships.
(83) (1896) 1 Com Cas 448.
(84) (1896) 1 Com Cas 448 at p. 452.
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Further, the property is not deemed to have been "sacrificed" if it was
already constructively lost at the time of the sacrifice and consequently there
would be no claim for contribution.(85)
By way of illustration on this point, the cases of Shepherd v. Kottgen(86)
and Corrie v. Coulthard (87) could be put forward. Although both cases involved
cutting away mainmasts, they nevertheless provide a good indication of the
factors considered by the courts in relation to the reality of the sacrifice or
expenditure.
In Shepherd v. Kottgen(88) a ship met with a heavy storm, which caused
parts of the rigging to give way. The mainmast in consequence began to lurch
violently, and threatened to rip open the deck. In these circumstances the mate,
by the master's orders, cut the mast, whereby its loss, which was already
inevitable, was accelerated by a minute or two. The action was by the
shipowners against the cargo-owners for a general average contribution for the
loss of the mast. The question arose as to whether at the time of sacrifice the
mast was virtually a wreck and valueless. At the trial the jury
found as a fact that the mast was valueless at the moment when it was cut
down. Therefore, a general average contribution claim by the shipowners was
not allowed.(89)
In the Court of Appeal, Bramwell L.J. said,:
"Where the thing destroyed has some peculiar condition attached to it,
so that it will be lost whether the whole adventure is saved or not, then the
destruction cannot be deemed a sacrifice... The mast was in such a state
that it must have been lost, whether the ship got safely to port or not.
Consequently there was no sacrifice of it when it was cut away, and the
plaintiffs have no claim for contribution."(90)
Brett L.J. also said on the point that:
"Where, whether the act relied upon as the act of sacrifice had been
done or not, the thing in respect of which contribution is claimed would,
by reason of its own state or condition, have been of no value whatever, or
(85) Carver, Carriage by Sea, 13th ed., at para 973.
(86) (1877) 2 C.P.D. 578.
(87) (1877) 3 Asp.M.C. 546. Unreported case mentioned in Shepherd v. Kottgen (1877) 2 C.P.D. 578.
(88) (1877) 2 C.P.D. 578.
(89) (1877) 2 C.P.D. 578, at p. 581.
(90) (1877) 2 C.P.D. 578, at p. 589.
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would have been certainly or absolutely lost to the owner, although the
rest of the adventure had been saved, there is nothing lost to the owner by
the act, and therefore there is nothing sacrificed, that is to say, there is no
sacrifice." (91)
In Corrie v. Coulthard(92) a ship met with a storm, which caused parts of
the rigging to give way. In consequence, the mainmast began to sway from side
to side and although crew and master attempted to tighten the rigging in order to
steady the mast, their attempts resulted in making the mast settling into the ship.
Consequently the master thought that there was danger of the mast going
through the ship's bottom, and ordered to cut it away. The jury found that it was
possible to save the mast, and it follows that the mast was of some value.
As Brett L.J. put it, "If, at the moment you sacrifice a thing it is of no
value, whatever future circumstances might arise, then if there is a sacrifice
there is no loss ...."(93)
Therefore, in the former case, it was not possible to save the mast and
consequently the mast was of no value, whereas in the latter case the opposite
was found to be true by the jury. In other words, in Corrie v. Coulthard the
sacrifice was real whereas in Shepherd v. Kottgen it was not.
A further important question arises as to who must make the sacrifice or
incur the expenditure. Is it essential for it to be the master or someone acting
under his authority?
Under EMC, the act must be ordered by the master.(94) It makes no
difference that the actual order is given by some other authority, provided

(91) (1877) 2 C.P.D. 578, at p. 590. See, too, Iredale v. China Trader's Insurance Co. [1899] 2 Q.B.356,
where a claim for contribution in respect of loss of freight upon a cargo of coal was disallowed on the
ground that the coal was in any event doomed to destruction, and could under no circumstances have been
carried to its destination. Bigham J. said, at page 358, that "the law is plain that where the thing sacrificed
is already valueless at the time of the general average act there can be no claim to contribution."
The same view appears to have been held in the U.S.A., where in the case of The Adele Thackera (1885)
24 Fed. Rep. 809, the court said: "If the lumber, in the condition which it had come to occupy through a
peril of the seas at the moment when the cutting of the lashings rook place, was practically irrecoverable
and of no value, then the cutting of the lashings, which was the only voluntary act, did not properly cause
the loss of the lumber. Practically it was lost already. The cutting of the lashings did not cause the loss of
anything having then any value, and hence would not be a ground of claim."
(92) (1877) 3 Asp. M.C. 546.
(93)(1877) 3 Asp. .C.546, at p. 567
(94) See the Explanatory Note to the Draft of the Emirati Maritime Code, p. 109 where it said '(free
translation) that every sacrifice or expense shall not be considered as a general average unless decided to
be made or incurred by the master.'
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that the master sanctions it. The YAR do not, however, restrict the power
to decide upon a general average act to the master alone.
In England, the act may be considered of general average even
where it is ordered by a stranger to the common adventure (e.g. a local
port authority),(95) provided that it is necessary for the common safety.
Carver pointed out that:
'The sacrifice ought, generally speaking, to be made under the
directions, or with the authority, of the master, or other person in
command of the ship. But that does not appear to be an essential;
the real questions are, was a sacrifice necessary for the general
safety? and were the measures taken reasonably prudent in view of
that necessity?'(96)
All direct losses that flow from the intentional act of the master are capable
of amounting to general average.
Under Article 345/1 of the EMC, a general average contribution can be
claimed only for the direct consequences of a general average act, that is, those
which flow in an unbroken sequence from the act, as opposed to indirect
consequences, where the sequence is broken by an intervening extraneous
cause. Article 345/2 declares not allowable, as not being direct consequences of
the general average act, loss or damage sustained by the ship or cargo through
delay, whether on the voyage or subsequently, such as demurrage or loss of
market suffered by the cargo.(97)
(95) See Papayanni v. Grampian SS Co (1896) 1 Com. Cas. 448. In this case a fire broke out on board
and the master put into port where the fire increased so that he sent for the captain of the port. The latter
ordered the scuttling of the ship, and the master believed this course to be best in the interests of the ship
and cargo, raised no objection, and in the opinion of the court, sanctioned it and thereby made it his own. It
was, therefore, held that the loss must be adjusted as a general average sacrifice.
A different rule has, however, been laid down by a majority in the Supreme Court of the United States. In
Ralli v. Troops, 157 U.S. 386 (1894), a case of a ship on fire, which was scuttled by the harbour
authorities, it was held that:
"The power and duty of determining what part of the common adventure shall be sacrificed for the safety
of the rest, and how and when the sacrifice shall be made, appertain to the master of the ship, magister
navis, as the person intrusted with the command and the safety of the common adventure, and of all the
interests comprised therein, for the benefit of all concerned, or to someone who, by the maritime law, acts
under him or succeeds to his authority."
Applying this rule, the court held that a sacrifice of ship or cargo by the act of a stranger to the adventure
gives no right of contribution, and that the port authorities were strangers to the maritime adventure and to
all interests included therein.
(96) Carver Carriage by Sea 13th ed. para. 1379.
(97) EMC, Article 345 reads in Arabic as follows:

. تدخل في الخسائر المشتركة األضرار المادية والمصاريف الناشئة مباشرة عن عمل له صفة الخسارة المشتركة-1
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Rule C of the YAR specifies that:
'Only such losses, damages or expenses which are the direct
consequence of the general average act shall be allowed as general
average. Loss or damage sustained by the ship or cargo through delay,
whether on the voyage or subsequently, such as demurrage, and any
indirect loss whatsoever, such as loss of market, shall not be admitted as
general average.'
The meaning of "direct consequences" was considered in Australian
Coastal Shipping v. Green,(98) the facts of which were as follows. A ship
"Bulwarra" was in port in New South Wales when a storm struck and put the
ship in imminent danger. A tug was engaged to tow Bulwarra to safety, but,
during the operation, a tow rope broke and wrapped itself around the tug's
propeller. Although Bulwarra reached safety, the tug drifted aground and
became a total loss. The tug's owners unsuccessfully claimed against
Bulwarra's owners under the contact of towage (UKSTC), but, in putting up a
defence, legal costs were incurred. Bulwarra's owners then claimed those
legal costs from their insurers as a general average expenditure.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the towage contract amounted to "general
average act"(99) under Rule C of the YAR 1950, and the loss and expenses
incurred were the direct consequence of such general average act.
Lord Denning MR put the matter in this way:
"...In the case of Bulwarra, the tug became a total loss.... The plaintiffs
have become bound under the indemnity clause to indemnify the tug
owners. Is this expenditure, under the indemnity clause, a 'general average
loss'? ....In these circumstances, I propose to go back to the concept, as 1
understand it, in 1924, when the York-Antwerp Rules were made. 'Direct
consequences' denote those consequences which flow in an unbroken
sequence from the act; whereas 'indirect consequences' are those in which
 أما األضرار والمصاريف غير المباشرة الناشئة عن التأخير أو تعطيل السفينة أو انخفاض أسعار البضائع أو-3
.غير ذلك فال تدخل في الخسائر المشتركة

In Anglo-Argentine Livestock v. Temperley [1899] 2 Q.B. 403 the extra expense of looking after the cattle
at the port of refuge were disallowed as being expenses caused by delay.
(98) [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.16; [1971] 1 Q.B. 456.
(99) The provision in the towage contract reads as follows:
'The Tug owner shall not, whilst towing, bear or be liable for damage of any description done by or to the
tug ... or for loss of the tug... arising from any cause, including negligence at any time of the Tug owner's
servants or agents... and the Hirer shall pay for all loss or damage... and shall also indemnity the Tug
owner against all consequences thereof... Provided that any such liability for loss or damage as above set
out is not caused by want of reasonable care on the part of the Tug owner to make his tugs seaworthy.'
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the sequence is broken by an intervening or extraneous cause ... If the
master, when he does the 'general average act', ought reasonably to have
foreseen that a subsequent accident of the kind might occur - or even that
there was a distinct possibility of it - then the subsequent accident does not
break the chain of causation. The loss or damage is the direct consequence
of the original general average act... If, however, there is a subsequent
incident which was only a remote possibility, it would be different...In
(Bulwarra)... the master, when he engaged the tug, should have envisaged
that it was distinctly possible that the towline might break and foul the
propeller. When it happened, therefore, it did not break the chain of
causation".(100)
There is no additional requirement that the particular losses that flow from
the intentional act should also be intended by the master. In McCall v. Houlder
Bros,(101) the ship's propeller sustained damage so that the ship ceased to be
navigable and the master put into a port of refuge for repairs. There was a
perishable cargo on board which could not be warehoused. In order to facilitate
repairs the master set the ship down by the head with cargo on board. The
tipping of the ship caused seawater to run into the hold and to damage part of
the cargo. It was contended that this was not a general average loss inasmuch as
(100) [1971] 1 Q.B. 456, 482-3. In Federal Commerce & Nav Co Ltd v Eisenerz GmbH (The Oak Hill)
[1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep.105,112 Ritchie J. in delivering the judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court said:
"if it be shown that loss or damage to cargo has been caused by the negligence of the master in carrying out
the general average procedure, it can no longer be said that it was direct consequence of the general
average act The chain of causation is broken by the intervention of a new cause"
In that case the facts were that the ship Oak Hill loaded two part cargoes of pig iron at Sorel, P.Q., for
carriage to Genoa. Owing to negligence of the pilot, for which the shipowners were by contract not
responsible, the ship stranded in the St. Lawrence river and put into the port of Levis, P.Q., as a port of
refuge for repairs. It was necessary to discharge and subsequently reload the pig iron in order that repairs
could be carried (Jut and, during the course of these operations, the cargoes became intermingled and to a
limited extent lost and destroyed. The cargo owner claimed for the full amount of the loss and damage. The
shipowners relied on Rule XII of the York- Antwerp Rules 1950 as a defence. It was found that the loss
and damage was caused by negligence of shipowners. The shipowners contended that the port of Levis was
so ill equipped for the reception of pig iron that the mixing and breaking might have taken place without
anybody's negligence, but this contention was rejected. The Supreme Court held the shipowners liable.
Richie J. said:
"In entering upon the general average act and in making all reasonable and necessary expenditures
consequent thereon, the master is to be taken as acting with the implied authority of the cargo owners as
well as the ship, but this authority does not extend so as to identify the cargo
owners with the negligence of the master or those employed by him in carrying out the general average
procedure or to derogate from his over- riding responsibility to care for the cargo in his capacity as the
servant of the ship owner."
(101) (1897) 66 LJQB 408.
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the damage to the cargo had not been foreseen as a consequence of the tipping
of the ship, and that the damage to the cargo was not incurred voluntarily. The
court held that the resultant damage to cargo was allowable in general average,
although the master had not intended it as a consequence of his manoeuvre.(102)
2.2.2. Reasonably made or incurred
In carrying out the general average act the master must act reasonably in
the interests of all concerned, even if his act is one of considerable
hazard.(103)
EMC in Article 342/1 and YAR 1994 in Rule Paramount(104) qualify both a
general average sacrifice and a general average expenditure being 'reasonably
made'. Presumably, this infers that the master of a ship must act reasonably
when making a sacrifice for which others will eventually be partly liable.

(102) See also Anglo-Grecian v. Benyon (1926) 24 Ll.Rep. 122 a ship's propeller fouled a wreck-marking
buoy in bad weather, and for the safety of the ship and cargo it was decided to beach her. The ship took the
ground sooner than was intended, and when the tide rose, she was carried on to rocks and seriously
damaged. It was held that at the time it was decided to beach her, the ship and cargo were in danger, and
that
there
was
an
intentional beaching, notwithstanding that the ship grounded at a place other than the selected place.
Furthermore, it was held that there having been no intervening act of negligence between the beaching and
the striking of the rocks, the damage done to the ship in striking the rocks was a direct consequence of the
beaching,
and
therefore
allowable in general average. Roche J. said :
“... although the grounding on the rocks was not at any rate foreseen as either a necessary or even a
probable consequence by the pilot, yet it was not a subsequent accident unconnected with the grounding. It
was at all times a possibility and it was a possibility which did not render the action of beaching
illegitimate, or render the subsequent materialisation of the possibility into an actuality so disconnected
with the beaching which brought it about as to break the chain of causation and prevent
the plaintiffs from recovering in respect of the damage done by the rocks."
(103) Chorley & Giles's Shipping Law, 18th ed. at p. 295. In The Seapool [1934] P 53, a ship at anchor
was caught up in a sudden gale and was at risk of losing her propellers and breaking her back. To avoid
this, the master engaged in a risky manoeuvre designed to get her out to sea and, although he was
successful, he caused damage to the ship and the pier in the process. These losses were held to amount to
general average.
(104) The Rule Paramount reads as follows:
'In no case shall there be any allowance for sacrifice or expenditure unless reasonably made or incurred.'
The Rule Paramount was introduced in the YAR 1994 in response to the case of The Alpha [1991] 2
Lloyd's L.R. 515 (Q.B.) in which the court held that, unlike the lettered Rules, the numbered Rules (in this
case, Rule VII) were not subject to the test of reasonableness. The facts of The Alpha as follows: damage
caused to the ship's engines while trying to refloat the ship, which was stranded in a perilous position. The
facts precisely satisfied the conditions of rule VII for admitting the injury to the ship's engines in general
average except for the additional element that the negligence of the master contributed substantially to the
damage sustained. That fact was treated as irrelevant by the court but now, under the Rule Paramount, the
unreasonableness of the master's conduct in attempting to refloat the ship would inhibit any allowance in
general average for the resulting damage. This example is clear enough, yet the same result might be
achieved in Emirati law, even in the absence of the Rule Paramount,

21

[Year 28, Issue No. 58 April 2014]

https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2014/iss58/8

[Journal of Sharia &Law]

42

M: ??????? ???????? ????? ?? ??????? ????????? ?????? ????-??????? ???????? ?????????

[General

Average A study of Emirati Law, York-Antwerp Rules and English Law]

Similarly, any expense incurred must be governed by the same criteria of
reasonableness.(105)
It is submitted that the reasonableness of the act must be judged in the light
of the emergency in which it was carried out, and the question is whether the act
was reasonable in the circumstances as they appeared at the time, not whether it
subsequently turns out to have been a good course to adopt. The purpose of the
requirement of reasonableness is to exclude those cases where it should have
been obvious, even in the agony of the moment, that the act was unnecessary or
imprudent, and there are few if any cases where an act has forfeited its general
average character merely on the ground that it was unreasonable.
In the case of expenditure, not only must it be reasonable, in the sense
described above, to adopt the course of action which involves the expenditure,
but the amount paid, or agreed to be paid, must also be reasonable. Where
services have been provided on fixed terms agreed in advance, the question is
whether it was reasonable for the master or owners, in all the circumstances, to
agree to the terms.
The issue of excessive or unreasonable expenditure was raised in Anderson
v. Ocean SS. Co.(106) an arrangement existed between two shipping companies,
the Ocean Steamship Company and the China Navigation Company, both of
whom operated up the Yangtze River. This arrangement was such that, should
either company's ships need assistance, the other company would provide that
assistance for a fixed fee of £2,500. Thus, when the steamship Achilles ran
aground in the river, Shanghai came to her assistance and towed her off for the
fixed sum previously agreed. When the Ocean Steamship Company, the owners
of Achilles, sought to recover from the cargo-owners in general average, the
cargo-owners objected to the payment, as they contended that the price had been
fixed by the owners and not the master, and that the fee was unreasonable.
The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and ruled
that, although the assistance amounted to general average, the sum charged was
unreasonable and, with respect to the cargo-owners, should be reduced.
In delivering his judgment Lord Blackburn said:

(105) See the Explanatory Note to the Draft of the Emirati Maritime Code, p. 108.
(106) (1884) 5 Asp. M.L.C 401, HL.
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"I have come to the conclusion that, on the evidence given at the trial,
it was not a simple issue whether the whole sum actually paid by the
shipowners to the owners of Shanghai was chargeable to general average,
and, if that was not made out, that nothing was to be recovered. I do not
think that it would follow merely from the shipowner having become
liable to pay and having paid that sum, that the whole of it was chargeable
to general average. I think it might well be that, on this evidence, the
proper conclusion was that something differing from that sum might be
chargeable, and I think that, till it is ascertained whether any sum was
chargeable, and what that sum was, the case is not ripe for decision.
... And though I quite agree that there is some evidence here that
Achilles and her cargo were both in danger, and were both saved by the
services of Shanghai, and though I also agree that it is not a question of
law whether the amount of the sum charged as a disbursement was
exorbitant or not, still I cannot find that any question as to the amount was
submitted to the jury. It seems to me that if such a question had been
submitted to a jury, there is much in the evidence that might make it very
doubtful whether the jury would think this sum properly chargeable
against the owners of the goods if uninsured".(107)
2.2. 3. Fault
While the sacrifice or expenditure may have been made intentionally and
reasonably and, so, qualify as a general average act, if the peril which
necessitates the extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure arose as a result of the
fault or negligence of one of the parties to the adventure, the act retains its
general average character and contribution is due between the parties to the
adventure, subject to the important exception that the party at fault is not
entitled to recover contribution from any other at whose suit the fault was
actionable at the time at which the sacrifice or expenditure was made or
incurred. EMC Article 344/1 provides that:
"(Free translation) The loss shall be considered as a general average
even though the accident resulted therefrom is due to the fault of one of
the parties to the adventure. This is without prejudice to the right of the
other parties for recourse to the individual by whom such error is
made."(108)

(107) (1884) 5 Asp MLC 401, 404.
(108) EMC, Article 344/1 reads in Arabic as follows:
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Rule D of the YAR provides that:
'Rights to contribution in general average shall not be affected, though
the event which gave rise to the sacrifice or expenditure may have been
due to the fault of one of the parties to the adventure, but this shall not
prejudice any remedies or defences which may be open against or to that
party in respect of such fault.'
In England, despite the earlier view, which apparently was that sacrifice or
expenditure occasioned by fault could not be treated as a general average
act,(109) it is now settled that innocent victims of a general average sacrifice may
claim contributions inter se as well as from one whose wrong caused the
danger. The rationale of this legal development was expressed by Lord Watson,
delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Strang v. Scott:(110)
"When a person who would otherwise have been entitled to claim
contribution has, by his own fault, occasioned the peril which immediately
gave rise to the claim, it would be manifestly unjust to permit him to
recover from those whose goods are saved, although they may be
said, in a certain sense, to have benefited by the sacrifice of his property ...
But the negligent navigation of the master cannot ... afford any pretext for
depriving those shippers whose goods were jettisoned of their
claim to a general contribution. They were not privy to the master's fault,
and were under no duty, legal or moral, to make a gratuitous sacrifice of
their goods, for the sake of others, in order to avert the consequences of is
fault. The Rhodian law, which in that respect is the law of England, bases
the right of contribution not upon the causes of the danger to the ship and
cargo, but upon its actual presence...."(111)
Thus, a carrier will not receive contributions in general average for expenses
reasonably made to save the ship and cargo when they are necessitated by the
unseaworthy condition of the ship," or, where the carriage contract is subject to
the Hague-Visby Rules, the failure of the owner to exercise due diligence to make
the ship seaworthy," as "the law is ... clear that a carrier is not entitled to recover
from a shipper a contribution in general average where the general average
" تعتبر الخسارة مشتركة ولو كان الحادث الذي نتجت عنه وقع بخطأ أحد ذوي الشأن في الرحلة وذلك بغير إخالل
".بحق ذوي الشأن اآلخرين في الرجوع على من صدر منه الخطأ

(109) Carver, Carriage by Sea, 13th ed., para. 1363.
(110) (1889) 14 App Cas 601 (PC).
(111) (1889) 14 App Cas 601, at pp. 608, 609 (PC). See also Pirie v. Middle Dock Co. (1881) 44 L.T. 426.
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situation was brought about by his own actionable fault".(112) In The Aga(113)
the defendants were owners of a cargo of timber shipped under ten bills of
lading in the 'Aga' from V to L. The bills of lading incorporated all the terms,
conditions, clauses and exceptions including arbitration clause, deviation clause
and general average of the charter party under which the ship was held. The
charter party stated that the owners were not to be liable for unseaworthiness of
the ship unless caused by a want of due diligence on the part of the owners of
the ship. It further stated that general average should be payable according to
the YAR.
The ship while at port took a list. The master, discovering the starboard
ballast tank to be unfilled (it was later discovered to have a hole in it) ordered it
to be filled. The list however continued and the master therefore beached the
ship and the list was remedied. In order to get the ship off the beach it became
necessary to get the assistance of a tug, and the ship was subsequently towed to
K. There she was dry docked and found to be need of repair and in order to
carry out such repairs it was necessary for the cargo to be unloaded. The ship
was finally fully repaired and reloaded by the 4th October, and she sailed for
London the next day.
Before the shipowners would permit the cargo owners to collect their cargo
they forced them to sign a Lloyd's general average bond in the usual form under
which they agreed to pay such general average contribution as should be owed
by them. The shipowners brought an action on the bond for the money owing to
them as a contribution in relation to the general average sacrifice and
expenditure incurred by them in the course of the above incidents. The cargo
owner contested the claim n the grounds of the shipowners lack of due diligence
to provide a seaworthy ship.
It was held, that the shipowners had established a prima facie case to a
general average contribution, but that the facts of the case showed that the Aga
(112) St. Lawrence Construction v. Federal Commerce and Navigation Co., [1985] 1 F.C. 767 at 788.
(113) Diestelkamp v. Bayes (Reading) Ltd., The Aga [1968] 1 Ll.Rep.431. See also The Ettrick (1881) 6
P.D.
127
where
the
question
was
whether
the
shipowner
could
claim contribution from the cargo towards the expense of raising ship and cargo which had been sunk
owing to negligent navigation by his servants. He had limited his liability under section 54 of the Merchant
Shipping Act 1862 and claimed that he should not be answerable in damages except as provided by that
section. Brett L.J. said at p. 135: " He has been in fault, and the authorities are decisive that if the general
average contribution· which he claims is a general average contribution which arose by reason of a default
of his, he cannot claim anything." And Cotton L.J. said at p. 137: "It would be against equity to say that the
person who himself has 'done the wrongful act which caused the expenditure shall claim thereupon from
anybody else."
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had insufficient reserve stability when she left her port f loading, and that due
diligence to make her seaworthy in that respect had not been exercised,
therefore the plaintiffs' claim failed.
It is submitted that in order that the party at fault be banned from recovering,
it is necessary that his "fault" be an "actionable fault" as Kennedy L.J. put it in
Reenshields, Cowie & Co. v. Stephens & Sons Ltd.(114) this default "must be
something which is wrongful in the eyes of the law, that is to say, something
which constitutes an actionable wrong". (115)
In this case a cargo of coal went on fire and as a result of water used in
putting it out, the cargo suffered badly. The cargo owners were held entitled to
claim a general average contribution since they were not guilty of any
actionable wrong.(116)
2.2.4. Fault and Exception Clauses
It is only actionable fault which bars the right to claim contribution, and
accordingly if the claimant is relieved, either by statute or by the terms of his
contract, of the consequences of his fault, that relief extends to his claim for
contribution, which is then not barred.(117) It is sufficient to preserve the claim
for contribution that the statute or contract exempts the claimant from liability
for physical loss or damage arising from the fault in question. It is not necessary
that it should wholly exonerate him from responsibility.(118) However, where the
statute or contract merely limits, as opposed to excluding, the claimant's
liability, or where it extinguishes his liability unless suit is brought within a
particular time, he will be unable to recover.
Under Emirati law the rights and liabilities of carrier is principally
governed by the Maritime Code. However, it is common for contracts of
carriages to exclude or restrict the carrier's liabilities. In these circumstances, the
(114) [1908] A.C. 431.
(115) Pearson J. in concluding his judgment on the point of fault, in Goulandris Brothers Ltd. v. B.
Goldman & Sons Ltd. [1958] 1 Q.B. 74, said, inter alia, at p. 104:
"It appears, therefore, in my opinion, that for the relevant purpose a 'fault' is a legal wrong which is
actionable as between the parties at the time when the general average sacrifice or expenditure is made."
This point was restated forcefully in 2001 in The Kamsar Voyager [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 57 at p. 65:
"Under English common law a shipowner is only debarred from recovering a G.A. contribution if the
expenditure was caused by his actionable fault...."
(116) The court further held that both parties were equally familiar with liability of coal to
spontaneous combustion in a climate like that of India.
(117) The Carron Park (1890) 15 P.D. 203; Milburn v. Jamaica Fruit, etc. Co [1900] 2 Q.B. 540 (C.A.).
(118) Louis Dreyfus & Co v. Tempus Shipping Co [1931] A.C. 726; The Makedonia [1962]1 Lloyd's
Rep. 316.
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carrier will not be prevented from making a general average claim, if his fault is
covered by a statutory provision or by special terms in the contract of carriage
absolving him from liability, e.g. for negligent navigation or for fire on board
happened without his actual fault.(119)But, where for example the carrier is
exempt from liability resulting from negligence of the master or crew, but not
from liability resulting from unseaworthiness, and the common adventure is
imperilled by both negligence and unseaworthiness, then the carrier will not be
entitled to general average contribution if the unseaworthiness is a real cause,
even though the negligence has contributed to the peril, which might not have
been brought about by the unseaworthiness alone.
English law is the same. It has been held that where the incident bringing
about the purported general average act is one for which the party at fault is
excepted from liability under the contract, then that party may recover general
average contribution from the other parties, the fault no longer being
actionable.(120)Thus, in The Carron Park(121) water got into the ship, through the
ship engineer's negligence, which consequently damaged some of the cargo. A
claim was made for contribution from the cargo in respect of general average
expenditure incurred in consequence of the water getting into the ship. It was
further contended that the shipowners could not recover the contribution
claimed. The charter-party stated inter alia that "any neglect or default
whatsoever of the pilot, master, crew, or other servants of the shipowners," was
to be excepted. It was held, that this exception justified the shipowner's claim.
(119) EMC, Article 344/2 provides that:
'The person who committed the mistake may not request that the damage he has incurred be considered to
be a joint loss. Notwithstanding this, if the accident resulted from a navigational error on the part of the
master, the disponent owner may ask that the damage he has incurred be considered as a general
average.'

" وال يجوز لمن صدر منه الخطأ أن يطلب اعتبار ما لحقه من ضرر خسارة مشتركة ومع ذلك إذا كان الحادث
ناشئا عن خطأ مالحي صادر من الربان جاز لمجهز السفينة أن يطلب اعتبار الضرر الذي أصابه خسارة
". مشتركة

(120) The Admiral Zmajavic [1983] 2 Ll.Rep.86: due diligence proper1y exercised by carrier, therefore
general average contribution payable; The Daffodyl 'B' [1983] 1 L1.Rep.498. Even if the exceptions
clause only protects against physical loss of or damage to the goods themselves, the shipowner is entitled
to recover contribution from cargo in respect of expenditures incurred to preserve it from such loss or
damage not withstanding that the peril was brought about by his own breach of contract: The Makedonia
[1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep, 316 at p.341.
It is, however submitted, that an exemption clause in favour of a party to the adventure only preserves his
right to claim contribution despite the fact that the peril arose as a result of his actionable fault, but does
not exonerate him from liability to contribute to a loss suffered by another party. In Schmidt v. Royal Mail
SS Co (1876) 45 L.J.Q.B. 646, it was held that an exception in a bill of lading of fire on board and its
consequences only relieved the ship-owners from their obligation to deliver under the circumstances to
which the exception related, and did not affect their liability to make a general average contribution.
(121) (1890) 15 P.D. 203.
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In delivering his judgment Sir James Hannen said:
"The claim for contribution as general average cannot be maintained
when it arises out of any negligence for which the shipowner is
responsible; but negligence for which he is not responsible is as foreign to
him as to the person who has suffered by it. The loss would not have
fallen on the shipowner, and the expenditure or sacrifice made by him is
not to avert loss from himself alone, but from the cargo-owners."(122)
Further, in Dreyfus (Louis) & Co. v. Tempus Shipping Co.,(123) a steamship
was chartered to proceed to various ports in the River Plate and there load a
cargo of grain for carriage to Hamburg. The shipowners had provided bunkers
coal more than enough to take the ship to the loading ports. However, the coal
was not stowed properly and it was unfit for the voyage. In this respect the ship
was unseaworthy. Whilst the ship was loading in the River Plate fire broke out
in the bunkers. The fire was extinguished, but, after sailing from the final
loading port, fire again broke out, and it became necessary to put into
Montevideo in order to discharge coal from the affected bunkers. As the ship
was British, the owners were entitled to the protection afforded by the
Merchant Shipping Act 1894. Section 502 of that Act is as follows: 'The owner
of a British sea-going ship, or any share therein, shall not be liable to make good
to any extent whatever any loss or damage happening without his actual fault or
privity in the following cases, namely, (I) Where any goods, merchandise, or
other things whatsoever taken in or put on board his ship are lost or damaged by
reason of fire on board the ship...'. The House of Lords held that the shipowners
were not deprived of the protection of this section of the Merchant Shipping
Act, even though the ship was unseaworthy by reason of fire in the bunkers, as
the unseaworthiness was without their actual fault or privity, and that they were
therefore entitled to recover the cargo's proportion of the general average
expenditure.(124)
(122) In Milburn v. Jamaica Fruit Co (1900) 2 Q.B. 540 a time charter had provided that negligence of
the master, etc., was to be " always mutually excepted"; but on the charterers' instructions, bills of lading
were given to shippers without any such exception, under indemnity from the charterers against the
consequences. The ship was damaged by collision, and general average expenditure was incurred by
having to put into port; but as the collision was due to the master's negligence, no contribution to that could
be recovered from the cargo. The Court of Appeal held that the charterers must make good the loss of this
contribution under the usual indemnity, on the ground that it would not have been lost if the
bills of lading had contained the negligence clause.
(123) [1931] A.C. 726.
(124) Under American law, however, contrary to English law, the mere fact that the negligent carrier is
immunized from liability for the loss or damage sustained by cargo by one or more provisions of the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) does not permit him to claim a general average contribution from
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In delivering his judgment, Lord Atkin said:
"It is now well established in our municipal law that a shipowner
cannot claim a contribution for a general average sacrifice or expenditure
where the peril that occasioned the sacrifice or expenditure was due to the
fault of himself or his servants. But this proposition is of little practical
value until a correct connotation is given to the word "fault"...(125)
I have dwelt upon the necessity for the fault to be actionable to
illustrate the cases relied on by the shipowner which seem to me to decide
that, where the act causing the peril is by convention of the parties not
actionable, the claimant who has committed the act is not precluded from
obtaining contribution...(126)
If by convention between the parties the so-called fault is an act which
is not actionable as between them, the foundation for the doctrine invoked
disappears. It is no longer a wrong of the shipowner which has caused the
peril: it is no longer inequitable for him to enforce a contribution."(127)
Where there is a combination of causes, one of which is the
shipowner's responsibility and the other is not, the matter will depend
upon whether the cause for which the shipowner is responsible was a
real cause: if it was a real cause, but not necessarily the dominant cause,
the shipowner will not be entitled to claim contribution to general
average despite the fact that neither cause operating alone would have
given rise to the general average act.
So, in the case of Smith, Hogg & Co. Ltd. v. Black Sea & Baltic General
Insurance Co. Ltd.,(128) the ship after loading at the commencement of
the voyage had a slight list which was not unusual and would have

cargo (see The Irrawaddy 171 U.S. 187 (1898)). If the carrier at fault is to recover from cargo in general
average the carrier's bill of lading must include a "Jason clause", which has evolved into the "New Jason
clause" since the enactment of COGSA in 1936. The New Jason Clause reads as follows:
'In the event of accident, danger, damage or disaster; before or after commencement of the voyage
resulting from any cause whatsoever; whether due to negligence or not, for which or for the consequence
of which the carrier is not responsible by statute, co tract or otherwise, the cargo, shippers, consignees or
owners of the cargo shall contribute with the carrier in General Average to the payment of any sacrifices,
losses or expenses of a General Average nature that may be made or incurred, and shall pay salvage and
special charges incurred in respect of the cargo. If a salvaging ship is owned or operated by the carrier,
salvage shall be paid for as fully as if the salving ship or ships belong to strangers'.
(125) [1931] A.C. 726 at p. 745.
(126) [1931] A.C. 726 at p. 747.
(127) [1931] A.C. 726 at pp. 749-750.
(128) H.L. (1940) 67 Ll.L.Rep. 253.
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been no cause for concern had the ship merely been loaded unsymmetrically
with sufficient weight concentrated low in the ship for stability. The ship was,
in fact unstable and therefore unseaworthy owing to all excessive deckload of
timber. During the voyage the master found it necessary to fill the forepeak with
ballast in order to compensate for the loss of weight in the bottom of the ship as
the coal stowed below the center of gravity was consumed. At an intermediate
port where the ship had called to replenish the bunkers, the master had the
forepeak pumped out, and thinking it would be undesirable to have further coal
put into the starboard side, to which side the ship was still listing, the master and
officers had the coal directed towards the port side resulting in the ship first
coming to a level keel and then as a result of her unstable condition suddenly
keeling disastrously over to port. Expert evidence was later given that the ship
was so tender and unstable owing to the excessive deckload that the weight of
coal could not have been put on board in the ordinary way without the ship
going on to her beam ends, although it might have been possible for calculations
to have been made for the coal to have been taken on board without the disaster.
The shipowner, under the terms of the charter-party, was not exempt from loss
arising from unseaworthiness caused by want of due diligence on his part,
although he was exempt from loss arising from act, neglect or default of the
master, mariners, pilot or the servants of the shipowner in the navigation or
management of the ship. It was held that the disaster would not have occurred
had due diligence been exercised to make the ship seaworthy and therefore the
shipowner was liable for the loss of and damage to the cargo and was not
entitled to any contribution to his general average expenditure from the insurers
of the cargo who had given a guarantee to pay the amount of general average
contribution properly due in respect of the cargo.
The interaction of fault and excuse becomes peculiarly difficult where
the ship's wrongdoing amounts to an unreasonable deviation. The case
of The Orient Trader(129) before the Supreme Court of Canada illustrates
the difficulties. Slabs of tin were shipped at Penang in the Orient Trader
for delivery at Hamilton, Ontario. The bills of lading incorporated United
States
C.O.G.S.A. 1936, Fire Statute sections, and York-Antwerp Rules. After
suffering heavy weather damage she began discharging cargo at Toronto
with a view to sending it to Hamilton by road. Fire broke out destroying
(129) The Orient Trader [1974] S.C.R. 128. In The Cepheus, 1990 AMC 1058 the owner's claim for a
general average contribution from cargo was denied where the panel majority found that the ship had made
an unreasonable deviation which the owner failed to prove was not the cause of the ship's stranding.
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ship and damaging cargo. Bill of lading holders claimed damages from
shipowner. Shipowner counterclaimed for general average contribution.
The Exchequer Court of Ontario heard evidence of United States law, and
gave judgment for the shipowner on claim and counterclaim. The bill of lading
holders appealed.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the exemption from liability
provided by the United States Fire Statute was lost in the case of deviation only
where the fire was causally connected with the deviation; it was
not. The shipowner was nevertheless entitled to general average contribution
under a New Jason Clause in the bills of lading. The court allowed
an appeal by the shipowner as to its question: interest was ordered to be
paid as from date of adjustment. The bill of lading holders' appeals were
dismissed.
The YAR respect the common law rule regarding fault in a way that allows
the process of general average to continue unhindered. Rule D states: 'Rights to
contribution in general average shall not be affected, though the event which
gave rise to the sacrifice or expenditure may have been due to the fault of one of
the parties to the adventure, but this shall not prejudice any remedies or
defences which may be open against or to that party in respect of such fault.'
The Courts(130) accept the common view that the effect of Rule D is, first, to
provide for the adjustment of general average without reference to any fault that
may have led to the general average act and, second, to preserve the remedies
available at law against any party in fault. This expedient rule divides the
complex issues of adjusting general average and determining legal liability into
a two-step process, which conveniently respects the great difference in laws and
professional experience that each stage engages.
One final point may be added here when the danger which necessitated the
sacrifice or expenditure was due to cargo's unfitness for the voyage, the cargo
owner can still claim contribution, subject to his conduct in shipping them.
Thus, where the condition of a cargo of oilcake had deteriorated during the
voyage due to inherent vice, unknown to the shipowners, the court in delivering
its decision stated inter alia:
"It would be unreasonable to make the shipowners responsible for
deterioration or damage caused by latent imperfection or defects of the

(130) Federal Commerece & Nav Co Ltd v Eisenerz Gmbh (The Oak Hill) [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 105.
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oilcake, which could not be supposed to have been known to them at the
time of shipment."(131)
In Greenshields, Cowie & Co. v. Stephens(132) a ship loaded a cargo of coal
at Calcutta for Bombay. Shortly after sailing, fire broke out in a hold, and
subsequently, after the ship had put into Colombo as a port of refuge, the fire
spread to two other holds. Water was used in an endeavour to extinguish the
fire, but it was found necessary to discharge the whole of the cargo and abandon
the voyage at Colombo. The plaintiffs, the owners of the steamer, claimed from
the defendants, the owners of the coal, a contribution to their general average
expenditure, and the defendants counterclaimed for the ship's proportion of the
damage done to the coal by water used in extinguishing the fire. The grounds on
which the shipowners denied that they were liable to contribute to the water
damage to the coal included: (I) that the immunity given to them by Section 502
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 in respect of damage arising by reason of
fire,(133) automatically extended to cases of general average damage arising in
consequence of fire, and (2) that the fire arose from spontaneous combustion of
the coal. It was held by the Court of Appeal, and affirmed by the House of
Lords that Section 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 did not relieve the
shipowners from the obligation imposed by common law to contribute to a
general average sacrifice. It was also held that the shipowner's plea in regard to
spontaneous combustion failed, as the owners of the cargo had not been guilty
of any negligence in the shipment of the cargo since both parties were familiar
with the liability of coal to spontaneous combustion in a climate like that of
India.
Finally, in Pirie v. Middle Dock Co.,(134) some coal cargo took fire due to
spontaneous combustion. Water was thrown on the coal to extinguish the fire
and thus a loss of the shipowners' freight occurred. The question before the
court was whether such loss should be treated as a general average loss. It was
held that the shipowner was entitled to a contribution in general average for the
lost freight, and that there was no claim on account of the cargo because the
vice in it was the cause of the sacrifice.
(131) The Freedom (1869) L.R. 3 P.C. 594, per Sir J. Napier, at p. 660.
(132) [1908] AC 431 (HL)
(133) 'The owner of a British sea-going ship, or any share therein, shall not be liable to make good to any
extent whatever any loss or damage happening without his actual fault or privity in the following cases,
namely, (I) Where any goods, merchandise, or other things whatsoever taken in or put on board his ship
are lost or damaged by reason of fire on board the ship...'.
(134) (1881) 44 L.T. 426; 4 Asp. M.C. 388.
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2.3. IN TIME OF PERIL
A loss may be claimed in general average if the general average act which
caused that loss was carried out 'in time of peril'.(135)The peril must be
substantial, not slight or nugatory.(136) In Daniolos v. Bunge & Co. Ltd.(137) the
ship loaded a cargo of grain at Rosario and Buenos Aires and proceeded to
Esbjerg, where she discharged part of her cargo, and then left for Randers.
While she was sailing up a narrow navigable channel, due to the strong current
she grounded. Efforts to refloat her by her own engines were unsuccessful, and
later a tug refloated her momentarily, but she was grounded again due to the
strong current and wind. Though continual efforts to refloat her were made, she
remained aground for approximately 4 days, in constant danger of being taken
further up the bank and of receiving damage to her bottom and structure, and of
collision with passing ships. She was refloated as a result of the water having
risen owing to the change in the wind direction. She then proceeded to Randers
where she discharged her cargo.
The court held that the ship and cargo were never in any substantial danger,
nor was there any added exposure to the danger of collision. Furthermore, it was
held that even if there was danger, everybody connected with the ship was of
the view that they were in no peril, and therefore any particular act done could
not be a general average act.
The peril must be real in the sense that a mistaken belief on the part of the
master that a peril threatens, even if his mistake is reasonable, will not justify a
sacrifice made or incurred to avoid a factually non-existent danger. The courts

(135) Under Article 342/1 of the EMC, actual peril must exist if a sacrifice or expenditure is to be treated
as a general average act and this condition is also adopted by the YAR, Rule A.
The word 'peril' is used in the EMC definition without any qualification, although in many of the
definitions given of general average it is stated that the peril must be imminent, which means that it must
be substantial and threatening and something more than the ordinary peril of the seas; see Societe Nouvelle
d'Annement v. Spillers and Bakers Ltd. [1917] 1 KB 865, per Sankey J. at p. 871: "a general average
expenditure must be incurred to avoid extraordinary and abnormal peril, as distinguished from the ordinary
and normal perils of the sea."
(136) See Vlassopoulos v. British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co (The "Makis") [1929] 1 K.B. 187,
200, per Roche J. put it(136):
"It is sufficient to say that the ship must be in danger or that the act must be done in order to preserve her
from peril. It means, of course, that the peril must be real and not imaginary, that it must be substantial and
not merely slight or nugatory. In short, it must be a real danger."
(137) (1938) 62 Ll. Rep. 175.
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appear united in their view that "real" refers to a peril that is existent as opposed
to imaginary.(138) Thus, in Watson (Joseph) and Son v. Fireman's Fund
Insurance Co. of San Francisco,(139) during the course of the voyage smoke
was seen issuing from the hold in which the resin was stowed and water was
played on the cargo in that hold. Steam was also injected into the hold and
considerable damage was done to the cargo. On arrival of the ship at Hull,
however, no evidence was found that there had ever been a fire in the ship. The
Court held that there had not been a general average sacrifice, inasmuch as the
damage arose from the mistaken idea that the ship and cargo were in peril,
whereas in fact no peril existed.(140) As Rowlatt J. put it:
"... It has been contended that there is a 'peril' within the Marine
Insurance Act 1906 in every case where the captain believes that it exists.
I do not think so.... It is one thing to say that where a peril in fact existed
one must take the view of the captain formed at the time the peril existed
as to what would be the outcome of that peril, and must not say to him, 'If
you had held on you would have found that all would have come right', or
something of that sort. It is another thing to say that one must take the
captain's view whether the state of facts existed which are alleged to have
constituted the peril ... The words of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 do
not justify me in saying that there is a peril whenever it looks as if there
was a peril."(141)
In The West Imbodene,(142) whilst a ship was in the height of a hurricane, it
was found that the deck above one of the holds was hot and later on vapour and
(138) Vlassopoulos v. British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co. Ltd., The Makis [1929] 1 KB. I87.
(139) [1922] 2 KB 355. Although the dispute arose under a policy of insurance, covering a cargo of resin
from New York to Hull, the case was decided upon the footing that the question was one of the English
law of general average.
(140) Under YAR 1974, Rule V the master is protected when, in a situation of actual danger, he makes a
sacrifice that later turns out to have been unnecessary:
'When a ship is intentionally run on shore for the common safety, whether or not she might have been
driven on shore, the consequent loss or damage shall be allowed in general average.'
(141) Watson (Joseph) and Son v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. of San Francisco [1922] 2 KB 355, at
p. 358.
(142) The West Imboden (1936) A.M.C. 696. Cf. The Wordsworth, 88 F. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1898) , where
the master allowed sluices to be opened when the forepeaks tank was found to be flooded. This action
caused cargo damage as the water was intentionally run off into the engine room where it was removed by
the pumps. It was later discovered that water had not entered through the shell plating, as the master
believed, but through the hawsepipes and, therefore, there was no need to open the sluices. Despite this
mistaken belief, the ship was allowed general average contribution. The West Imboden court distinguished
the case on the ground that in Wordsworth there was an actual peril to the cargo, the master being merely
mistaken as to its degree.
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steam was rising from that hold. Consequently, the master and officers
concluded there was a fire in the hold, and steam and water was injected into the
hold. At destination it was found that no fire had ever existed but a steam pipe
in the hold near the deck was broken. It was held that although in this case the
act of the master was a "reasonable" one, there was no actual peril to the cargo
and therefore, there was no real danger of the ship being lost through fire, as fire
did not exist.
In a given situation the danger to a ship and cargo may be real and
substantial albeit not imminent.(143) In Vlassopoulos v. British & Foreign
Marine Insurance Co (The Makis)(144) a ship was engaged in loading cargo at
Bordeaux, the foremast broke, fell on the main deck and caused a derrick to fall
into the holds. The ship was at no time in danger, but she was moved into a wet
dock for repairs. After repairs were completed she finished loading and put out
to sea. There she fouled with a submerged wreckage and damaged her propeller
blades. This accident made the ship unfit to encounter the ordinary perils of the
sea, and she put into Cherbourg for inspection and repairs, which were
necessary for the common safety of the ship, cargo and freight. It was held, that
expenses at Bordeaux were not general average expenditure since the ship was
at no time in danger. But the expenses at Cherbourg were general average
expenditure, for the properties involved in the adventure were in danger.
Roche J. stated, in delivering the judgment of the Court, that it was not
necessary for the ship to actually be:

(143) In US, while the early cases such as Barnard v. Adams 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270,303 (1850) speak of
the need for an imminent peril threatening the ship, modern cases have liberalized this requirement. A
showing of a peril is still required, but it need not be imminent. The change was explained in Navigazione
Generale Italiana v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. (1937) 92 Fed. Rep.(2nd) 41 "we think the
'imminence' of the peril is not the critical test. If the danger be real and substantial, a sacrifice or
expenditure made in good faith for the common interest is justified". Cf. The Alcona (1881) 9
Fed.Rep.l72, "it seems ... that we must look only to the circumstances in which the ship was placed, and
not to the particular measures employed, to determine whether the case is a proper one for contribution."
per Brown D.J. at p. 173.
In Come v. Coulthard (1877) 3Asp. M.L.C. 546 there was a real danger of the mainmast, being loose,
working through the bottom of the ship. Although the possibility of this happening was found later by
the courts to be minimal, and that the peril would have had no disastrous results, it was held that the
loss incurred in averting that peril was a general average loss. In other words the danger was existent,
but not imminent.
(144) [1929] I K.B.187, decided under the YAR 1924. See also Corrie v. Coulthard(144) where there was
a real danger of the mainmast, being loose, working through the bottom of the ship. Although the
possibility of this happening was found later by the courts to be minimal, and that the peril would have had
no disastrous results, it was held that the loss incurred in averting that peril was a general average loss. In
other words the danger was existent, but not imminent.
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"... in the grip, or even nearly in the grip, of the disaster that may arise
from a danger. It would be a very bad thing if shipmasters had to wait
until that state of thing arose in order to justify them doing any act which
would be a general average act." (145)
EMC and YAR adopt the same approach. Under EMC, the peril must be
real in the sense that a mistaken belief on the part of the master that a peril
threatens, even if his mistake is reasonable, will not justify a sacrifice made or
incurred to avoid a factually non-existent expenditure danger. Any other view
would mean that the general average act has been made unnecessarily.
It seems that, provided the danger was real, EMC does not require it to be
imminent.(146)
Under YAR, while Rule A demands the general average act be made in a
time of peril, two of the numbered rules, which have overriding effect, admit
expenditures on certain measures in general average though incurred in the
absence of any immediate danger. Rule X (b)(147) and the dependent Rule
XI(b)(148) allow as general average the expenses of handling and discharging
(145) [1929] I K..B.187, at p. 199.
(146) See the Explanatory Note to the Draft of the Emirati Maritime Code, p. 108.
(147) YAR 1974, Rule X(b):
'Expenses at port of refuge etc.
The cost of handling on board or discharging cargo, fuel or stores whether at a port or place of loading, call
or refuge, shall be admitted as general average, when the handling or discharge was necessary for the
common safety or to enable damage to the ship caused by sacrifice or accident to be repaired if the repairs
were necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage, except in cases where the damage to the ship is
discovered at a port or place of loading or call without any accident or other extraordinary circumstances
connected with such damage having taken place during the voyage.
The cost of handling on board or discharging cargo, fuel or stores shall not be admissible as general
average when incurred solely for the purpose of restowage due to shifting during the voyage unless such
restowage is necessary for the common safety.'
(148) YAR 1974, Rule XI(b):
'Wages and maintenance of crew and other expenses bearing up for and in a port of refuge, etc.
When a ship shall have entered or been detained in any port or place in consequence of accident, sacrifice
or other extraordinary circumstances which render that necessary for the common safety, or to enable
damage to the ship caused by sacrifice or accident to be repaired, if the repairs were necessary for the safe
prosecution of the voyage, the wages and maintenance of the master, officers, and crew reasonably
incurred during the extra period of detention in such port or place until the ship shall or should have been
made ready to proceed upon her voyage, shall be admitted in general average.
Provided that when damage to the ship is discovered at a port or place of loading or call without any
accident or other extraordinary circumstance connected with such damage having taken place during the
voyage, then the wages and maintenance of master, officers and crew and fuel and stores consumed during
the extra detention for repairs to damage so discovered shall not be admissible as general average, even if
the repairs are necessary for the safe prosecution of the voyage.
When the ship is condemned or does not proceed on her original voyage, wages and maintenance of the
master, officers and crew and fuel and stores consumed shall be admitted as general average only up to the
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cargo, fuel, and stores in a port of refuge as well as the wages and maintenance
costs of the crew during the period of the ship's detention in specified
circumstances. As long as these expenses are incurred for the common safety of
the ship and cargo in a time of peril, they are entirely within the general
principles of general average. Thus a ship that is holed by a collision at sea and
limps into a port of refuge still in danger of sinking may claim the cost of
moving cargo and other detention expenses made in the course of securing its
safety. Similarly, a ship that calls at an intermediate port where it suffers a
collision or a fire may claim similar expenses in the course of coping with the
common peril. But once the ship has achieved safety in the port of refuge, there
is no longer any peril facing ship and cargo, which requires expenditure in
common. The costs of necessary repairs to the ship and, along with them, any
expenses for caring for the cargo and maintaining the crew during the period of
detention, would ordinarily be an incident of the voyage for the shipowner's
account. However Rules X (b) and XI (b) allow these kinds of expenses during
detention of the ship in the port of refuge for repairs as general average ''if the
repairs were necessary for the safe prosecution or the voyage." Since no
reference is made to the presence of any common peril, expenses admitted in
these circumstances have been called "artificial general average."(149) An
alternative view of them is that, even though the ship be made safe in the port of
refuge, it would not be fit to proceed further on the voyage unrepaired; if it were
to do so, it would immediately face peril at sea.
In other words, under rules X (b) and XI (b), common peril is still a
prerequisite to general average expenditure but it need not be imminent or
impending; it is sufficient if apprehended or anticipated.
Danger only to Human Life
Article 342 of the EMC and Rule A of the YAR do not mention that a
general average loss's characteristic is the voluntary sacrifice for the general
safety of the lives and property involved.(150) In American case of Shoe v. Low

date of the ship's condemnation or of the abandonment of the voyage or up to the date of completion of
discharge of cargo if the condemnation or abandonment takes place before that date.
Fuel and stores consumed during the extra period of detention shall be admitted as general average, except
such fuel and stores as are consumed in effecting repairs not allowable in general average.
Port charges incurred during the extra period of detention shall likewise be admitted as general average
except such charges as are incurred solely by reason of repairs not allowable in general average.'
(149) See W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd ed. 1988, at 729.
(150) Danger to life alone is sufficient in English law. In The Gratitudine (1801) 3 C.Rob.240, 258 Lord
Scott in delivering the judgment of the court, said inter alia:
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Moor Iron CO.,(151) a ship was dragging her anchor in a gale and was in danger
of going ashore. The master slipped the cable, and thus voluntarily stranded her
in the same place as she would have been if he had not slipped the cable.
The district court held that the act of the master in slipping the cable was
done for the purpose of saving life, and with no other motive, and therefore
there was no case of general average. (152)
The denial in including human life in the subjects of general average, is best
explained by Dr. Lushington, when he was considering a salvage case :
"The jurisdiction of the [Admiralty] Court ... is founded upon a
proceeding against property which has been saved, and I am at a loss to
conceive upon what principle the owners can be made answerable for the
mere saving of life."(153)
In conclusion, it could be said that under the law of general average life
does not represent a component of a common maritime adventure, and therefore
if a general average act takes place solely for saving the lives of those on board,
such act would not be treated as general average.
2.4. COMMON SAFETY OF THE VOYAGE
Loss is general average only when the act had been done 'for the common
safety for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a

"Nothing
can
be
better
settled
than
that
the
master
has
a
right
to
exercise this power, (of jettison), in case of imminent danger ... he may determine what quantity; no
proportion is limited ... in cases of extreme necessity, when the lives of the crew cannot otherwise be
saved, it never can be maintained that he might not throw the whole cargo over board. - The only
obligation will be that the ship should contribute its average proportion. It is said, this power of throwing
over the whole cannot be, but in cases of extreme danger, which sweeps all ordinary rules before it; and so
it is ...."
In Montgomery & Co. v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Insurance Co., [1902] I K.B. 734, 740 Vaughan
Williams L.J. said inter alia:
"It is not, we think, true to say that it is only the danger to the ship, freight or cargo which necessitates and
justifies sacrifice by the master of either a portion of the cargo or a portion of the ship. This may be done in
fear of death, and if it is done upon a proper occasion all must contribute to the loss".
(151) (1891) 46 Fed. Rep. 125.
(152) The libellant appealed and the Circuit of Appeals. Second Circuit, affirmed the decision on grounds
that the master by slipping the cable, stranded the ship "substantially in the same
place, under the same conditions, and with the same result to the cargo" 49 Fed.Rep.252, at page 253. Cf.
the provisions of M.S.A 1894 providing that if a ship, apparel, cargo and lives are salved, a salvage claim
may be brought against the property saved, whether or not other claims are brought; The Willem III
(1871) L.R. 3 A& E.487.
(153) The Zephyrus (1842) 1 W.Rob.329, at p.331.
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common maritime adventure'.(154)The duty to contribute in general average is
predicated upon this fundamental idea that loss sustained by one or more parties
to the voyage was incurred for the safety and preservation of the property of
all.(155) Thus, in Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. English Bank of Rio,(156) A
ship, The Tagus, on a voyage from Rio de Janeiro to Southampton stranded in a
dangerous position near Bahia, having on board specie worth £125,000. The
master landed the specie and, after jettisoning part of the cargo, the ship was
subsequently refloated with the assistance of tugs. The specie was taken to
Bahia and forwarded to the United Kingdom in another ship, but it was agreed
that for general average purposes it was to be regarded as though carried
forward by The Tagus. In an action brought by the shipowners against the
owners of the specie, to recover a contribution in general average to the cost of
making good the value of the jettisoned cargo, and of refloating the ship, the
Court held that the specie could not be called upon to contribute to the
general average expenses. It was also held that the cost of landing the specie
was not a general average expense as it was not incurred for the safety of the
interests involved, but solely with a view to the safety of the specie itself.
Wills J. laid down the rule as follows:
"If the object of the removal has been the lightening of the ship for the
common safety, and the object of effecting the removal in such a fashion
as to avoid jettison has been to do to that which must be got overboard
something less wasteful than actual jettison, there seems to be no reason
whatever for drawing a distinction between such a case and that of actual
(154) See EMC, Article 342/1 and the YAR, Rule A
(155) It is submitted that when one party has a pecuniary interest in more than one
facet of a marine adventure (e.g. a shipowner may also own the cargo, and it therefore stands to
reason that he must also be the party who is interested in the earning of the freight) there cannot be a
general average loss as the interested parties to the common adventure are one and the same.
However, the insurance of a general average loss is an entirely different matter. Here, the insurer is not
concerned with who owns the property, but only that he has to indemnify the assured. The issue of whether
there could be a general average loss when the parties to the common adventure were one and the same
was raised in Montgomery and Co v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Insurance Co, [1902]1 KB 734. The
plaintiffs were the owners of both the sailing ship Airlie and the cargo of nitrate aboard her. The cargo was
insured with the defendants. On the voyage from the west coast of South America to the UK, Airlie ran
into difficulties, and, in order to save both the ship and cargo, the mainmast was cut away.
The plaintiffs then sought to recover an indemnity from the defendants to cover the cost of the general
average contribution which became due to the ship. The question before the court was, whether there could
be a general average loss, with respect to a policy of insurance, when the assured was the owner of both the
ship and cargo.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial judge, and ruled that there could be a general
average loss when the assured was the owner of both the ship and the cargo.
(156) (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 362.
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jettison, so far as liability to general average is concerned. But if the
lightening of the ship formed no part, or no appreciable part, of the
purpose for which the removal was effected, if the object of the removal
was not to minimize the cost of jettison but to get out of harm's way the
thing removed and to prevent it from being or remaining at risk at all, it
seems to me that a different result may very well ensue, and that a portion
of cargo landed under such circumstances may well be regarded as
separated from the adventure, and no longer liable for contribution. There
is authority for saying that the purpose for which an act causing loss is
done may determine whether it constitutes general average or not."(157)
In Hingston v. Wendt(158) where the cargo was salved from the sunken
wreck of a sailing ship by an agent of the master, the court held that, although
the agent held a lien on the cargo, the act of saving the cargo alone, though
analogous to general average, was not in fact so. "....The plaintiff," said
Blackburn J. "a ship agent at Dartmouth, was put in possession of the wrecked
ship and cargo by the captain, with, as we understand the case, authority from
the captain to do, as his agent, what was for the benefit of all concerned. The
plaintiff did the work, and expended the money sued for in discharging the
cargo, and he brought it to a place of safety, where he kept possession of it. The
hull remained on shore, and ultimately broke up, and was sold as a wreck. We
think we must take it on the statement to be the fact, that this expenditure was
not incurred on behalf of the master as agent of the shipowner, performing on
his contract to carry on the cargo to its destination and earn freight, but was an
extraordinary expenditure for the purpose of saving the property at risk; and had
the expenditure been for the purpose of saving the whole venture, ship as well
as cargo, it would have constituted a general average, to which the owners of
each part of the property saved must have contributed rateably, and the captain,
and the plaintiff, as his agent, would have had a lien or right to retain each part
of the property saved till the amount of the contribution due in respect of it was
paid or secured.(159)
In A. Magsaysay, Inc. v. ANASTACIO AGAN(160) the plaintiff owned a
ship, which carried general cargo belonging to different shippers among them
the defendant. When the ship was in the port of Aparri, it ran aground at the

(157) (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 362, at p. 372 et seq.
(158) (1876) 1 QBD 367.
(159) (1876) 1 QBD 367, at p. 370.
(160) G.R. No. L-6393 January 31, 1955
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mouth of the Cagayan River. Attempts to refloat her under its own power
having failed; plaintiff had her refloated by the Luzon Stevedoring Co. at an
agreed compensation. After refloating, the ship proceeded to its destination and
delivered its cargoes to their respective owners. On the theory that the expenses
incurred in floating the ship constituted general average to which both the ship
and cargo should contribute, the plaintiff brought this action against the
defendant for his contribution.
The Supreme Court held: "It is the deliverance from an immediate,
impending peril, by a common sacrifice that constitutes the essence of general
average...In the present case, there is no proof that the ship had to be put afloat
to save her from an imminent danger. What does appear ... is that the ship had to
be salvaged in order to enable her to 'proceed to her port of destination. ... It is
the safety of the property and not the voyage, which constitutes the true
foundation of general average." Furthermore, "the expenses in question were not
incurred for the common safety of ship and cargo, since they, or at least the
cargo, were not an imminent peril.
The Court further said:
"The cargo could, without need of expensive salvage operation, have
been unloaded by the owners if they had been required to do so ... the
salvage operation, it is true, was a success. But as the sacrifice was for the
benefit of the ship- to enable her to proceed to her destination - and not for
the purpose of saving the cargo, the cargo owners are not in law bound to
contribute the expenses."
It follows from these propositions that loss resulting from sacrifice
or expenditure will not be admitted in general average if it was
incurred after the common voyage has been terminated(161) or the ship has
been placed in safety.(162)
(161) In Ellerman Lines v. Gibbs, Nathaniel (Canada) [1986] 2 F.C. 463 (C.A.), since the cargo owners
took delivery of the cargo in Montreal, short of the contracted destination of Toronto, the court held that
the connection between the ship and the cargo was permanently severed, and that any subsequent expenses
were incurred for the safety of the ship alone.
(162) See Dobson v. Wilson (1813) 3 Camp 480, where a ship is forced to put into a port to repair damage
done to her by a storm, and the master, having no other means of raising money, sells (as he is justified in
doing) pan of the cargo to defray the expenses of repairs, the owner of the cargo sold does not thereby
sustain a general average loss. See, too, Western Assurance Co. v. Ontario Coal Co. (1892), 21 S.C.R.
383, where a ship, loaded with coal, became stranded and was abandoned, the cargo owners were not liable
to contribute in general average for the expenses incurred in subsequently trying to raise the ship and cargo
because they did not face a common peril. The cargo owners were only bound to pay the much lesser cost
of salvaging the cargo.
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The parties common to the voyage may include several ships and
cargoes. One or more tugs towing one or more barges loaded with one or
more cargoes is an example. Rule B, added to the YAR in
1994 to cope with divergent practice internationally, acknowledges the
unity of such a flotilla. The Rules apply to the flotilla as a whole whenever
measures are taken to preserve it from a common peril;(163) but, if a ship
achieves safety simply by disconnection, it is no longer regarded as being
imperilled on a common voyage with the rest of the interests - unless
the disconnection itself was a general average act.
2.5. Success
Article 342/1 of the EMC does not specify that success is a criterion of
general average. It refers merely to the extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure
being intentionally and reasonably made or incurred "for the common safety for
the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a common
maritime adventure". Nevertheless, no allowance is made in general average for
sacrifices or expenditures, unless they actually succeeded in securing the safety
of the property involved in the common maritime adventure. If, in making the
general average sacrifice or expenditure, no property in the venture is saved,
there would be no forthcoming contributions, because nobody has benefited
from the general average act. Unless there is a degree of success, there can be
no surviving property upon which the value of contributions may be established.
The whole idea underlying the doctrine of general average is that it is just that
those whose property has been saved should contribute to those whose property
has been sacrificed to save theirs. If the sacrifice is not successful, in the sense
that no property escapes the dangers from which the sacrifice was intended to
save it, this does not apply. Further, under EMC the fund from which the
contribution to the general average act is made is based on the value of the
property saved at the end of the adventure.

(163) Rule B of the YAR 1994 read as follows:
'There is a common maritime adventure when one or more ships are towing or pushing another ship or
ships, provided that they are all involved in commercial activities and not in a salvage operation.
When measures are taken to preserve the ships and their cargoes, if any, from a common peril, these Rules
shall apply.
A ship is not in common peril with another ship or ships if by simply disconnecting from the other ship or
ships she is in safety; but if the disconnection is itself a general average act the common maritime
adventure continues.'
Whether the same is the case under EMC or English law is undecided.
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Whether the success needs to be total or only partial is not entirely clear, but
if, it is suggested, some portion of the property survives, there is some element
of success, and, thus, something tangible on which contributions may be levied.
If this were not the case, the loss would be in particular average, and any such
loss would lie where it fell.
It is convenient here to mention a special problem. What happens if
the general average act has been successful, but subsequently, owing to
new causes, ship and cargo are lost?
Suppose a ship has suffered a general average loss, for instance, in the form
of expenses incurred at a port of refuge for repairs, and incidental expenses, and
subsequently ship and cargo are totally lost before the destination is reached.
The question arises as to whether the interests who have benefited by the
general average expenditure must still contribute though subsequently this
benefit has been lost. The answer is that no contribution is due.(164)
At first sight this might seem inequitable, but the reason is fairly
clear. Every maritime adventure is, to a certain extent, governed by a
rule of limited liability; in principle no co-adventurer is supposed to lose
directly more than the amount originally staked. In other words, if
a party to the adventure, say, a cargo-owner, is called upon to make a
payment directly arising from the adventure, such as a general average
contribution, he must be able to make the payment from the goods on
board, out of the fund that has been saved by the general average act. If
after the general average loss, but before the end of the adventure, the
cargo originally liable is lost, there is no longer any fund out of which
the cargo interest can pay its contribution. Thus, in Fletcher v. Alexander(165)
Bovill C.J. said:
"If however, after the jettison or the matter which is the subject of
average has arisen, the remainder of the goods is entirely lost, and so no
benefit accrues to the owners of the other goods from the jettison, no
contribution can be claimed. The whole law on the subject is founded on
the principle that the loss to the individual whose goods are sacrificed for
the benefit of the rest is to be compensated according to the loss sustained
on the one hand, and the benefit derived on the other."

(164) Chellew v. Royal Commission on the Sugar Supply [1921] 2 K.B. 627, per Sankey J
[I922] I K.B. 12. Lowndes and Rudolf (1975) paras 809, 811.
(165) (1868) L.R. 3 C.P.375.
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3. ADJUSTMENT OF GENERAL AVERAGE
3.1. Defining Adjustment
Adjustment of general average is a process in which the parties to a general
average claim examine the evidence, ascertain the value of general average, the
value of the saved ship and property, and determine the contributions of each
concerning party to the general average so agreed by them. If a general average
is determined by a court of law, the adjustment of general average is carried out
according to instructions of the court. The adjustment should be carried out by
an official adjuster whose task is to draw up a statement of adjustment.(166)
Article 351 of the EMC sets out the general principles for the adjustment of
general average. The parties to a general average claim are allowed to determine
the use of particular adjustment rules in their contract. In the absence of any
agreement, the parties must follow the relevant principles of the EMC,
particularly Article 351, in adjusting general average.(167)
3.2. Categories of General Average
General average is usually divided into three categories: sacrifice of ship as
general average, sacrifice of cargo as general average and sacrifice of freight as
general average. Adjustment rules for each category are different. Article 351 of
the EMC sets out rules for adjusting only the first two types of general
average.(168)

(166) EMC, Article 357 provides that:
"(Free translation) Adjustment of general average shall be made by one or more experts to be appointed by
the competent court unless the parties concerned agree upon who shall be appointed."
(167) EMC, Article 340/2 provides that:
"(Free Translation) General Average shall be settled in accordance with the following provisions unless
there is a specific agreement to the contrary between the parties concerned."
(168) EMC, Article 351 reads as follows:
"(Free translation)The creditor group shall include losses and expenses which are deemed to be general
average estimated as follows:
(a) The amount of damage sustained by the ship shall be calculated on the basis of reasonable costs in fact
expended in repair, and in the event that repairs have not been effected the sum shall be fixed by way of
estimate and if the ship is a total loss or if it is a constructive total loss the sum to be included as general
average shall be specified on the basis of the sound value of the ship immediately before the incident
occurred and after deduction of the estimated cost of repairs which do not have the character of general
average and the price obtained from the sale of the wreck if any.
(b) The value of the loss sustained by the goods in the event of loss or destruction shall be calculated on
the basis of the commercial value on the last day of discharge of the ship at the port of destination or upon
the day of the termination of the voyage if it did not terminate at the said port, and if the goods were sold
damaged, the damage which shall be included in the general average shall be fixed on the basis of the
difference between the net value arising from the sale and the net value of the goods in a sound condition
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i) Sacrifice of Ship
Under EMC, Article 351/a the sacrifice of ship as general average can be
further divided into damage to the ship and sacrifice of fuel and equipment on
board the ship. The general rules of adjusting the sacrifice of ship are discussed
in the following paragraphs.
First, when the damaged ship has been fully repaired, the sum of general
average is determined by deducting a reasonable sum, which represents the
difference between the value of the replaced parts and the cost for the new parts,
from the total cost for the repair. The parties making contributions to a general
average are only obliged to restore the damaged ship to its original state. Repair
cost includes the cost of the new parts. This means that the value of the repaired
ship may be higher than the value of the ship before the general average. The
sum of the cost exceeding the original value of the replaced parts should not be
paid by the parties sharing the general average. Therefore, it is fair to compare
the cost of the new parts and the value of the replaced parts prior to the general
average and to deduct the sum exceeding the original value of the replaced part
from the sum of general average to be shared by the parties who have benefited
from the general average. In other words, no matter what the price of the new
parts, the general average allowable on the parts is limited to the value of the
replaced parts before the general average. Similarly, the total repair cost
allowable as general average must be reasonable. The ship owner is not allowed
to use the opportunity to ask the other parties to share the cost for the repair that
is unrelated to the maritime peril leading to the occurrence of the general
average.
Second, if the damaged ship has not been repaired at the time of adjustment,
the general average on the ship should be a reasonable sum of ship's devaluation
caused by the general average, but in any event, the sum must not exceed a
reasonable estimate of the repair cost. The reasonable devaluation of the ship
on the last day of discharge of the ship at the port of destination or on the day of termination of the voyage
if the voyage did not terminate at the said port."

:تدرج في المجموعة الدائنة األضرار والنفقات التي تعتبر من الخسائر المشتركة مقدرة كما يأتي
 يقدر قيمة الضرر الذي يصيب السفينة بالنفقات المعقولة التي تصرف فعال في اإلصالح وذلك بعد خصم فرق التجديد-أ
 وفي حالة عدم إجراء اإلصالح يحدد المبلغ بطريقة تقديرية فإذا هلكت السفينة،وفقا للصرف والثمن المتحصل من بيع الحطام
كليا أو هالكا في حكم الكلي حدد المبلغ الذي يدخل في الخسائر المشتركة على أساس قيمة السفينة سليمة قبل وقوع الحادث
مباشرة بعد خصم القيمة التقديرية لإلصالحات التي ليست لها صفة الخسائر المشتركة والثمن المتحصل من بيع الحطام ان
.وجد
 وتقدر قيمة الضرر الذي يصيب البضائع في حالة الهالك أو التلف على أساس القيمة التجارية في آخر يوم لتفريغ-ب
 واذا بيعت البضائع التالفة حدد،السفينة في الميناء المقصود أو في يوم انتهاء الرحلة إذا انتهت في غير الميناء المذكور
الضرر الذي ي دخل في الخسائر المشتركة على أساس الفرق بين الثمن الصافي الناتج من البيع والقيمة الصافية للبضائع وهي
.سليمة في أخر يوم لتفريغ السفينة في الميناء المقصود أو في يوم انتهاء الرحلة إذا انتهت في غير الميناء المذكور
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refers to the difference between the estimated market prices of the ship before
and after the general average. The reasonable repair cost limits the sum of
general average allowed in the sense that the difference in the market prices of
the ship becomes too great due to the existence of volatile market.(169)
The reasonable cost for ship repair excludes the sum of the cost on the new
parts which exceeds the estimated value of the replaced parts prior to the
general average.
Third, when a ship has sustained a total loss or the repair cost exceeds the
estimated market value of the ship after the repair, general average should be
determined by referring to the market value of the ship, deducting from it the
estimated cost for repairing the damage falling outside the general average and
the remaining value of the damaged ship. The deduction of the cost for repairing
a damage that is not regarded as general average is applicable when the ship has
sustained a particular average during the same event when the general average
occurred. The deduction of the particular average and remaining value of the
ship reflects the principle that only the sacrifice or loss sustained for the
common interest of the parties concerned should be allowed as general average.
ii) Sacrifice of Cargo
(169) Under YAR, in cases of sacrifice of a part of the ship or its equipment that is subsequently repaired
or replaced, Rule XVII sets the amount recoverable in general average as "the actual reasonable cost"
incurred. This amount will be reduced by one-third when old materials or parts are replaced by new if the
ship is more than fifteen years old (Rule XIII). When the sacrifice is not made good, the reasonable
depreciation in the value of the ship is calculated and admitted, so long as it does not exceed the estimated
cost of repairs. If the ship is an actual or constructive total loss, the value of its sacrifice is calculated by
estimating its sound value and deducting the estimated repair costs for any damage outside general average
and its sale value, if any, as a casualty.
Rule XVIII reads:
'Damage to ship.
The amount to be allowed as general average for damage or loss to the ship, her machinery and/or gear
caused by a general average act shall be as follows:
(a) When repaired or replaced,
The actual reasonable cost of repairing or replacing such damage or loss subject to deduction in accordance
with Rule XIII;
(b) When not repaired or replaced,
The reasonable depreciation arising from such damage or loss, but not exceeding the estimated cost of
repairs. But where the ship is an actual total loss or when the cost of repairs of the damage would exceed
the value of the ship when repaired, the amount to be allowed as general average shall be the difference
between the estimated sound value of the ship after deducting therefrom the estimated cost of repairing
damage which is not general average and the value of the ship in her damaged state which may be
measured by the net proceeds of sale, if any'.
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General average of cargo can be classified as either a total loss or a partial
loss (or damage to cargo). The different adjustment rules apply to the different
types of loss. These rules are to be examined in the following paragraphs.
First, when the cargo has sustained a total loss, the general average on the
cargo should be calculated on the basis of the price of the cargo at the time of
discharge, adding to it the cost of insurance and freight but deducting from it the
part of the freight saved because of the loss of the cargo. The deduction is
applicable when the contract of carriage permits the cargo to claim a partial
refund of the freight in case the cargo is lost before reaching the scheduled
destination. The loss of profit on the cargo sacrificed as general average is not
allowed as general average.
Second, in case of partial loss or damage to the cargo, the parties should
reach an agreement on the extent of the loss and lost value. Such agreement is
the ground for determining the general average on damage to the cargo. If the
damaged cargo was sold before the parties reach any agreement, the general
average is based on the value of the cargo at the time of discharge, adding to it
the cost of insurance and freight, but deducting from it the net income received
from the sale of the cargo. The cargo owner has an obligation to mitigate the
loss. Even if the ship owner exercises the right of lien over the saved cargo, he
also has an obligation to mitigate the loss. Therefore, it is not uncommon for the
damaged cargo to be sold before any agreement on the extent of the loss can be
reached by the parties. It can thus be assumed that if the parties cannot agree on
the extent of the damage to the cargo, the cargo owner can always sell the cargo
in a reasonable manner and claim general average. The price of the damaged
cargo so sold must be reasonable in the circumstance concerned.(170)
iii) Sacrifice of Freight
Article 351 of the EMC does not expressly deal with freight. However,
(170) Under YAR, when cargo is sacrificed, the amount to be made good in general average, according to
Rule XVI, is its net sound value calculated from its commercial invoice, if available. When the cargo is
merely damaged and sold, the proceeds f sale are subtracted from the net sound value (unless there is
agreement as to the cargo's depreciation).
Rule XVI reads as follows:'Amount to be made good for cargo lost or damaged by sacrifice.
The amount to be made good as general average for damage to or loss of cargo sacrificed shall be the loss
which has been sustained thereby based on the value at the time of discharge, ascertained from the
commercial invoice rendered to the receiver or if there is no such invoice from the shipped value The value
at the time of discharge shall include the cost of insurance and freight except insofar as such freight is at
the risk of interests other than the cargo.
When cargo so damaged is sold and the amount of the damage has not been otherwise agreed, the loss to
be made good in general average shall be the difference between the net proceeds of sale and the net sound
value as computed in the first paragraph of this Rule.'
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freight is an independent category of general average. It refers to the loss of the
carrier, who is the ship owner in most cases. The loss of freight occurs when the
cargo for which the freight is payable has been sacrificed as general average.
The carrier will suffer a loss of freight if the contract of carriage stipulates that
the carrier undertakes the risk for such a loss.
The freight allowable as general average is based on the total loss of the
freight on the sacrificed cargo, deducting from it the operational cost spent for
the earning of the freight.(171) However, there is no need to deduct the
operational cost saved on the sacrificed cargo from the loss of freight. If the
cargo owner bears the risk for the loss of freight, the ship owner would not
suffer any loss if the cargo concerned is lost before arriving at the port of
destination. In such case, the cargo owner whose cargo has been sacrificed as
the general average is entitled to claim the loss of freight as general average.
3.3. Contribution to General Average
Contribution to general average means that parties who have benefited from
the general average make contributions to the party who has made special
sacrifice or incurred special expenditure allowable as general average to
compensate the loss. A party may be a contributor to general average or a
recipient of contribution. In such case, he bears the loss of general average
correspondent to the value of property saved by the general average.
Contributions in general average depend upon an appropriate valuation of
the losses sustained and the property saved. This is a highly
technical matter for which average adjusters rely on a body of professional
practice in addition to the guidance of a number of the EMC Articles. As a
general proposition, Article 353/a states: 'The ship shall be included at her true
net value at the port in which the voyage ends ....'(172) Thus, if the general
average claim is for expenses incurred in an intermediate port during repairs and
the ship complete its intended voyage, valuation of the contributing interests
will be made at the port of destination; but if the voyage is abandoned at some
mid-point, perhaps because the ship is wrecked or the cargo is separated or lost,
contributing property will be valued at that place.(173) As a legal consequence of
(171) Under YAR, when lost freight is admissible in general average, only the net loss, after deduction of
the charges that would have been incurred to earn the freight, is allowed.
(172) See YAR, Rule G which states:
'General average shall be adjusted as regards both loss and contribution upon the basis of values at the time
and place when and where the adventure ends.'
(173) In Fletcher v. Alexander (1868) 18 L.T.432, Bovilll, C.J. said at p. 434 that:
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this rule, and in the absence of any contractual provision, the law of the place
where the common voyage ends, and value are assessed, will ordinarily govern
the process of general average adjustment.(174)
Contribution to general average is related to the value saved by the general
average. Along with the value of the ship and cargo so saved, the payment to be
received by the party making sacrifice and incurring expenditures need also be
taken into account. The international shipping practice normally calculates the
ship, cargo and freight separately. Article 353 of the EMC sets out general
principles for calculating the contribution in each of these circumstances.
Article 353 reads as follows:
"(Free Translation) There shall be included in the debtor group the
ship, freight and goods loaded on the ship in the following:
a) The ship shall be included at its true net value at the port in which
the voyage ends in addition if appropriate to the amount of the sacrifices
which it has borne.
b) The ship's total freight shall include the fares of passengers at the
rate of two thirds with the exception of ship's freight which is agreed to be
earned in any event.
c) There shall be included goods salvaged and goods sacrificed
according to their actual or estimated commercial value at the port of
discharge." (175)
"... it has now been the adopted and settled law of this country; and I believe most other countries...that the
adjustment must take place according to the law of the place where the adjustment is to be settled. If a ship
reaches
her
ultimate
port
of
destination
the
adjustment
must
take place according to the law of the port where she so arrives. If the adventure comes to an end, and the
voyage is 'broken up' ... at some other port, the adjustment must take place at that place, and according to
the law of that place."(173)
In the American case of Loring v. The Neptune Inc Co. (1938) 20 Pick.411, Shaw C.J. said at p. 413:
"The general average in the present case was made up and adjusted at Hamburgh, the port of destination, at
which the several interests liable to contribute, were necessarily to be separated from each other.
Hamburgh therefore was the proper place for the adjustment and payment of this general average. Such
general average must necessarily be adjusted according to the laws and usages of the place where the
adjustment was made."
(174) In English law assessment of general average contribution must be made when and
where the voyage is completed by the delivery of the cargo at the port of discharge, unless the voyage is
terminated short of the intended destination, in which case the time and place of the termination govern the
assessment. The voyage may be terminated by. agreement, frustration, or transhipment, provided
transhipment does not amount to substitution of the carrying ship for another. It follows that if, after a
general average sacrifice is made or an expenditure incurred, the ship and cargo are lost before the
conclusion of the voyage, no general average contribution can be c1aimed (see Simonds v. White (1824) 2
B.& C.805. Also see Dalglish v. Davidson (1824) 5 Dowl.& Ry1.6.
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i) Contribution by Ship
Contribution by a ship should be calculated by a reasonable and feasible
method to determine the saved value of the ship. Under Article 353/a the saved
value of the ship is based on the net real price of the undamaged ship (as if it
were a seaworthy ship) at the end of the voyage in which the general average
takes place plus the sum of general average on the ship.(176) The damage to the
ship falling outside the general average must be deducted from the net real price
of the ship. The net real price of the undamaged ship can be determined by
referring to the age of the ship, the cost of accessories added later on and a
reasonable rate of depreciation.
ii)Contribution by Cargo
Cargo will be valued according to its market value at the port of
discharge. If cargo is discharged damaged, its value in damaged
condition will be the relevant value for assessing its share of general
average. From this value, there must be deducted any expenses that
would have been saved had the adventure been totally lost, such as
freight payable on delivery, import duty, or salvage charges.(177)
(175) EMC, Article 353 reads in Arabic as follows:

: على النحو اآلتي،" تدرج في المجموعة المدينة كل من السفينة وأجرة النقل والبضائع المشحونة في السفينة
 تدرج السفينة بقيمتها الحقيقية الصافية في الميناء الذي تنتهي فيه الرحلة مضافا إليها عند االقتضاء قيمة-أ
.التضحيات التي تحملتها
 تدرج أجرة السفينة اإلجمالية وأجرة نقل المسافرين بمقدار الثلثين فيما عدا أجرة السفينة التي يشترط استحقاقها-ب
. في جميع األحوال
" . تدرج البضائع المنقذة والبضائع المضحى بها بحسب قيمتها التجارية الحقيقية أو المقدرة في ميناء التفريغ-ج

(176) Under YAR, Rule XVII, the ship is assessed for its market value without regard to any demise or
time charter commitments. If damage that gave rise to the general average act has been repaired, then the
cost of repairs must be deducted from its market value to determine its actual net value at the termination
of the voyage. Rule XVII reads :
'The contribution to a general average shall be made upon the actual net value of the property at the
termination of the adventure... The value of the ship shall be assessed without taking into account the
beneficial or detrimental effect of any demise or time charter-party to which the ship may be committed.
To these values shall be added the amount made good as general average for property sacrificed, if not
already included, deduction being made from the freight and passage money at risk of such charges and
crew's wages as would not have been incurred in earning the freight had the ship... been totally lost at the
date of the general average act and have not been allowed as general average; deduction being also made
from the value of the property of all extra charges incurred in respect thereof subsequently to the general
average act, except such charges as are allowed in general average...'
(177) Under YAR, Rule XVII, the value of saved cargo is calculated, as for cargo loss, from it commercial
invoice. To this amount is added insurance and freight, if at the cargo owner's
risk; but from it is deducted any particular charges, such as discharging costs perhaps, incurred after and
not in relation to the general average act. However, if the goods are sold short of the destination, their sale
price will be utilized instead. Rule XVII reads as follows:
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General Average and Falsely Declared Cargo
In shipping practice, cargo owners or shippers often fail to disclose the true
value and nature of the cargo on customs declaration forms. Cargo owners or
shippers may have deliberately declared a price of cargo to the customs lower
than its real value. Such cargo may be involved in a general average claim.
Article 348/2 of the EMC specifically deals with the situation in which a falsely
declared cargo or an undeclared cargo has been involved in a general average
claim.(178) A falsely declared cargo refers to a cargo given a wrong description
by the cargo owner or shipping in the relevant customs document. Under this
provision, a falsely declared cargo or an undeclared cargo that has benefited
from a general average must make contributions to the general average. However, the provision does not permit the owner of a falsely declared or undeclared
cargo to claim a special sacrifice of the cargo. This means that Article 348/2
purports to punish the owner of a falsely declared or undeclared cargo by
disallowing the cargo to be listed as general average even if the cargo has been
sacrificed for the common safety of the ship and other cargo on board. The
punishment is reasonable in the sense that after the loss of the cargo it would be
difficult to prove the real value and nature of the cargo because the owner has
failed to declare it truthfully.
Article 348/2 also regulates situations in which a cargo owner or shipper has
'The contribution to a general average shall be made upon the ... value of cargo ... at the time of discharge,
ascertained from the commercial invoice rendered to the receiver or if there is no such invoice from the
shipped value. The value of the cargo shall include the cost of insurance and freight unless and insofar as
such freight is at the risk of interests other than the cargo, deducting therefrom any loss or damage suffered
by the cargo prior to or at the time of discharge... To these values shall be added the amount made good as
general average for property sacrificed, if not already included, deduction being made from the freight and
passage money at risk of such charges and crew's wages as would not have been incurred in earning the
freight had the... cargo been totally lost at the date of the general average act and have not been allowed as
general average; deduction being also made from the value of the property of all extra charges incurred in
respect thereof subsequently to the general average act, except such charges as are allowed in general
average.
Where cargo is sold short of destination, however, it shall contribute upon the actual net proceeds of sale,
with the addition of any amount made good as general average.
Passenger's luggage and personal effects not shipped under bill of lading shall not contribute in general
average.'
(178) EMC, Article 348/2 reads as follows:
'(Free translation) Goods which have been stated to have a lower value than their real value shall not be
accepted as general average if they are lost or damaged, except on the basis of the declared value but if
they are salvaged they should contribute upon their actual value.'

" البضائع التي قدم عنها بيان بأقل من قيمتها الحقيقية ال تقبل في الخسائر المشتركة إذا هي هلكت أو تلفت إال
على أساس القيمة التي وردت في البيان فإذا أنقذت فإنها تسهم في الخسائر المشتركة على أساس قيمتها
".الحقيقية
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deliberately declared a lower value for the cargo involving in a general average
claim. In such cases, the contribution by such a cargo to general average should
be calculated by referring to the actual value of the cargo. On the other hand, if
such a cargo has been sacrificed as general average, the value of the general
average should be calculated by referring to the value of cargo declared in the
relevant customs forms.(179) This also appears to be a penalty to the owner
declaring the lower value. Article 348/2 does not apply to a situation where the
cargo owner or shipper has made an innocent mistake in declaring a wrong
value for the cargo.
iii) Contribution by Freight
Contribution of the saved freight to the general average is determined by
referring to the ship's total freight which shall include the fares of passengers at
the rate of two thirds with the exception of ship's freight which is agreed to be
earned in any event.(180)
These are the basic methods of calculating contributions to general average
adopted by the EMC. The purpose of making contributions to general average is
let the beneficiaries of general average to compensate the party suffering the
loss of general average. If two or more separate general averages have taken
place during the same voyage and parties to each general average act are
different, each general average must be calculated individually. On the other
hand, if the parties are the same, the separate incidents of general average may
be calculated together.
4. COCLUSION:
General average is a maritime principle about sharing loss among the parties
interested in the voyage on which the loss was incurred. It is an ancient regime
recognised and applied by all maritime nations. The underlying purpose of the
principle is to compensate a party for loss deliberately incurred to save the
(179) Under YAR, Rule XIX, sacrifice of cargo that is misdescribed by the shipper will not be admitted in
general average, and damage or loss of cargo that is undervalued on shipment will be made good only up
to its declared value. Rule XIX reads: 'Undeclared or wrongfully declared cargo.
Damage or loss caused to goods loaded without the knowledge of the shipowner or his agent or to goods
wilfully misdescribed at time of shipment shall not be allowed as general average but such goods shall
remain liable to contribute, if saved.
Damage or loss caused to goods which have been wrongfully declared on shipment at a value which is
lower than their real value shall be contributed for at the declared value, but such goods shall contribute
upon their actual value'.
(180) Under YAR, Rule XVII, net freight earned contributes separately in general average when at the risk
of the shipowner and is valued at the rate due from the cargo owners.
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voyage. Compensation is made by levying a proportionate contribution on all
the parties to the voyage. Typically nowadays general average is governed by
the York-Antwerp Rules through their incorporation into the contract of
carriage, whether evidenced by a charterparty or by a bill of lading. Emirati
Maritime Code has adopted the York-Antwerp Rules in Articles 340-365. But
Emirati courts have not yet had the opportunity to deal with general average
matters. Therefore, and in order to understand how the rules operate and have
been applied and construed a reference has been made to English decisions
which are considered the main source in this respect.
A study of English law and that of Emirati Maritime Code, reveals a
close similarity between them. The definition and requirements of general
average are the same under both jurisdictions. To give rise to a claim for general
average contribution:
(a) The loss must be extraordinary. Loss sustained by reason of the ordinary
incidents of the voyage cannot therefore amount to general a average. Property
that is sacrificed may consist of the ship, the cargo, or the freight or any
combination of them.
The expenditure must also be extraordinary. The cost of salvaging ship and
cargo or expenditure incidental to repairing the ship in a port of refuge are
common examples. Expenses made in anticipation of greater general average
expenditure - known as "substituted expenses" - and costs incurred to protect
the environment may also be recovered in general average.
(b) The extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure must be intentionally and
reasonably made. If the loss is involuntary it is particular average, to which the
ordinary rules of legal liability apply. Or, if the loss is caused by the fault of an
interest, that interest loses its rights to claim in general average.
General average situations sometimes occur as a result of fault or negligence
of the shipowner or employees that is excusable in law. Under Emirati and
English law the shipowner is fully entitled to participate in the general average
settlement.
Further, in order to uphold a claim for general average, there must be a
casual connection between the loss and the general average act.
(c) The extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure must be made or incurred
in a time of peril. If the master is mistaken as to the existence of a peril, losses
sustained in consequence of his actions cannot amount to general average. The
act must be made for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved
22
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in the voyage, and the peril must be a danger which threatened the whole
adventure and not part of it only. However, also the danger must be
imminent; though it need not be actually pressing at the moment, or such
that there is no chance of relief from it.
(d) The extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure must be made or incurred
for the specific purpose of preserving the property imperilled in the
common adventure. Two consequences follow from this. Firstly,
expenses incurred after an interest has been brought to safety cannot be
claimed in general average against that interest. Secondly, general
average depends on the ultimate success of the adventure.
When general average is declared by the shipowner, a professional average
adjuster is appointed whose task is to draw up a statement of adjustment.
Contributions in general average depend upon an appropriate valuation of
the losses sustained and the property saved. This is a highly technical matter for
which average adjusters rely on a body of professional practice in addition to
the guidance of a number of the Article 351 of the Emirati Maritime Code.
At English and Emirati law, the basic rule is that the relevant
interests are valued at the termination of the adventure with discharge at
the port of destination. This is the case both for valuing sacrifices and
for establishing each interest's share of general average. Where the
voyage is abandoned at a port of refuge, either by agreement or because
the underlying contracts of carriage have become frustrated, the relevant
values are those pertaining at the time and place of abandonment.
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ملخص
حبث اخلسارة املشتركة
دراسة يف القانون االمارايت وقواعد يورك-انتويرب والقانون االجنليزي

أستاذ القانون التجاري والبحري المشارك -كلية القانون – جامعة اإلمارات

تعتبررر القواعررد لخاصررة بالخسررارة المشررتركة مررن أقرردم قواعررد القررانون البحررري .وترجررع

تلك القواعد الى حقيقرة أنره اثنراء الرحلرة البحريرة تكرون لجميرع المشراركين فيهرا مصرلحة
مشررتركة تتمثررل فرري وصررول السررفينة سررالمة .ولكررن إذا تعرضررت هررذه المصررلحة المشررتركة

ال ررى خط ررر وك رران م ررن ال واج ررب القي ررام بتض ررحية غي ررر اعتيادي ررة أو تحم ررل نفق ررات طارئ ررة
لتجرراوز هررذا الخطررر فررأن هررذه التضررحية أو النفقررات تقسررم علررى جميررع المشرراركين ف رري

الرحلة كل بحسب الفائدة التي عادت عليه من التضحية.
وقررد تطررورت قواعررد الخسررارة المشررتركة عبررر السررنين وعق رردت عرردة اتفاقيررات دوليررة

أهمها اتفاقية يورك –انتويرب تنضم توزيع الخسارة المشرتركة .وقرد تبنرى القرانون البحرري
االماراتي قواعد يورك -أنتويرب .
والغرض من هذا البحث هو مناقشة مبدأ الخسارة المشتركة وكيف فسر القضاء

قواعد الخسارة المشتركة.
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